During the first few years of World War I, European nations modernized weapons with machine guns, tanks, airplanes and larger artillery, leaving the American CMIB unable to supply munitions to these new weapon systems. Manufacturing problems, such as tooling delays, labor shortages and inadequate experience forced the government to rely upon foreign firms for most of its munitions requirements. Still, the United States was able to expand its capacity from six government arsenals and two private firms in 1914 to about 20 arsenals and nearly 8,000 ordnance-related manufacturing plants three years later.
That was from an excellent 2017 paper, The Conventional Munitions Industrial Base. Interesting throughout. I don’t think enough attention is being paid to GOGO facilities and organic capacity in the munitions industrial base.
Here are some additional data and viewpoints, this time for WWII:
Prior to the war, there were only two government and two private plants that made smokeless powder, along with six ordnance manufacturing arsenals, all capable of providing no more than 5 percent of the war’s required munitions… Fortunately, the military had maintained some technical knowledge in these government-owned, government-operated (GOGO) munitions installations, maintaining capabilities to instruct private industry on how to manufacture munitions, while simultaneously serving as the nucleus of the production effort for the wartime effort.
The wartime demands forced the United States to construct nearly 60 manufacturing plants— 25 for loading, 21 for producing explosives and smokeless powder and 12 for producing chemical components of explosives—all operating under private contractors.
The author tells a story about the production of 81mm visual light rounds during the GWOT, and two commercial firms failed to meet test requirements (50% failure). The Army was forced to develop the manufacturing capabilities itself, and Crane was able to produce at less than a 1% failure rate. It took the commercial firms 18 months to fail, and the Army plant took 24 months to succeed.
I think folks should think about the historical facts when they claim government can’t and should not actually produce anything. The relevant question is, what capabilities should government maintain organically and what can be completely outsourced.
I was bewildered by this article claiming consolidation of small private shipyards would improve Navy ship maintenance (particularly for noncombatants). It shows that private industry might not be trusted to make rational decisions with respect to nonmarket existential threats like war. Government either has to pay industry very well to increase capacity — basically pay for all of its infrastructure — or create organic capacity. Industry will minimize capacity at every turn to maximize short-term earnings.
Government owned, contractor operated facilities are an interesting compromise created in WWII. I think there is wisdom there, but there’s always the problem of who pays for what. Neither government nor industry wants to pay for capital equipment or maintenance, claiming it is the other party’s responsibility. A mix of GOGO, GOCO, and COCO is optimal in my mind.
Eric – Congress is always eager to fund global social issues which provides great political press coverage. However when it comes to our national defense there has been historical opposition. Commerical enterprises have a fiduciary responsibility to their shareholders. The government has a similar responsibility relative to the security of its citizens. I fail to see how Congress can evade the capital investments noted.