Can the F-35 really achieve a 15-to-1 kill ratio?

… the U.S. Air Force F-35A Lightning II, who had just been declared IOC (Initial Operational Capable) achieved a resounding score in mock aerial engagements against Aggressors: while early reports suggested a 15-1 kill ratio a subsequent Air Force testimony by Lt. Gen. Jerry D. Harris, Vice Commander of Air Combat Command characterized the kill ratio as “20-1”

That was from back in 2017…. Here’s Tyler Rogoway providing some skepticism:

How can we really judge F-35A’s supposed kill ratio without knowing those of other platforms used in the exercise, or even historical numbers from other exercises? For instance, what was the F-15C’s kill ratio? Or the F-22’s? What about the Royal Air Force’s Typhoons? How about red air’s corresponding kill ratio? 15:1 sounds great, but it really is about the same as what the US Navy experienced with their Topgun graduates in Vietnam, a time when F-4s were taking on MiG-17s and MiG-21s. In the end we have nothing to compare this number to, and “lesser” platforms could have gotten as high a ratio or even higher, we just don’t know.

I was under the impression that in Vietnam, the F-4 had a kill ratio near 2-to-1, maybe less, which means that the skill advantage provided by Topgun is severely underrated if it can push the needle closer to 15-to-1. Perhaps training and tactics are more powerful a tool than technology-at-any-cost advocates let on. Perhaps an innovative enemy could turn the advantage with an unforeseen countermeasure.

I’ll add some additional points of possible skepticism to the (old) news. Raytheon reports: “The F-35 can carry up to two AIM-9X missiles on its wings and four AIM-120 AMRAAM missiles internally.” That means each F-35 can only kill 6 aircraft at the very most on each sortie, unless it is getting in there and gunning down another dozen. But we’ve known for some time that the F-35A gun isn’t working properly:

“The F-35A gun has been consistently missing ground targets during strafe testing; the program is still troubleshooting the problems.” The gun shoots “long, and to the right.”

And then, the F-35 also loses some stealth when it carries in two external Sidewinders. Not clear how much that reduces stealth, however.

At any rate, let’s give the Air Force the benefit of the doubt and say, “sure, the F-35 gets a 15-to-1 kill ratio, but it can only do that over two sorties, on average.” That’s generous. But still, over any given battlefield, that means to achieve something like parity, the number of aircraft you’d need to field at a single time is twice what the 15-to-1 ratio implies. (Also, if Lanchester’s square-law holds, you’d need to field even more F-35s to maintain parity.)

With the introduction of multiple sorties, we also get into the realistic part about aircraft maintenance, fuel consumption, availability, and so forth. And the F-35 has relatively low availability rates. We have introduced the important element of time (and entropy). An aircraft expected to make 15 enemy kills on average may still not be very useful if it can only achieve the 15th kill over a prolonged timeframe counted in months rather than days or hours.

And of course, none of this is in reference to the cost of achieving this effectiveness. Perhaps high availability can only be bought at prohibitive expense. Or missiles were unavailable due to problems facing the industrial base.

The F-35 may still overcome issues with, for example, maintainability. We tend to look fondly back on the F-18A-D models today. Perhaps this is encouraging:

The 13 F-35As maintained a 90 percent mission capable rate during the three-week exercise, respectable for any combat aircraft. Planes did have problems, including one that lost a generator, but every issue was dealt with inside of 24 hours, according to two Air Force officers talking to reporters today at the end of the exercises.

But I estimate that these tests would be performed a lot more frequently and discussed a lot more openly if they were done in realistic operational environments. And that is not a criticism of the F-35, but of the poor incentives generated by the DOD’s organizational design. Perhaps the Air Force is banking on its old adage that there is no technical problem so hard that cannot be overcome by a healthy dose of management pressure.

I wonder if the Marines and Navy are following suit to assure the success of the more complex F-35B and C models at any cost. It seems by now they are past the point where they will drop out, like in the case of the F-111. And defiance of the joint service mandate by funding an unauthorized program, like in the case of the F-18, seems even more remote.