DoD programs are over-analyzed, yet decisions remain superficial and shallow

I drop you into an exchange between Senator Scoop Jackson and Alain Enthoven, ASD Systems Analysis and one of McNamara’s ‘whiz kids,’ in a 1967 hearing. You may remember that the TFX, later named the F-111, was supposed to be a joint Air Force/Navy fighter-bomber aircraft. In many ways, it was the F-35 of its day, the largest program in the history to that time.

Sen. Jackson: … the TFX is the largest single military procurement in terms of dollars in the history of our Government. The key question at issue was whether a common plane would actually meet the needs of the two Services. Some of us on this committee were involved in those earlier hearings on the TFX. The argument was made that commonality would save us a billion dollars. That was supposed to be the way we were going to save a lot of money.

 

It is quite clear that we have not been able to achieve the objective of commonality that was laid down by DOD at the time-nor to make the savings in money that were promised. The estimated cost of the Navy plane is now $10 million per plane, including support. My point is: was it not possible in 1961 and 1962 to use the systems analysis techniques — operations research and so on — that were available and that you were using to cancel Skybolt, to ascertain whether or not this approach to TFX was a sound one? That is my basic question.

 

Dr. Enthoven. The decision that both Services would use the same basic plane was made by September 1961. It was based simply on the common sense judgment that the Navy and the Air Force requirements were sufficiently similar and the TFX sufficiently versatile that the Services ought to be able to agree on the same fighter plane, and the F-4 shows that they can.

By September 1961, McNamara and Enthoven had been leading DoD for nine months. They had very intimate connections with the origins of the TFX program, and it is well documented that the TFX was an early poster-child of the systems analysis methodology. There’s even Robert Art’s tellingly titled book: The TFX Decision: McNamara and the Military.

So it is a little shocking to hear Enthoven say the whole thing was based on the “common sense judgment.” The whole idea of systems analysis and its twin concept, the program budget, is to perform rigorous analyses of all forms of costs and measures of effectiveness. Most sources I’ve seen talk about a lengthy documentation phase for the TFX according to system analysis principles.

The reliance on the F-4 example as a rationale for why a joint aircraft is “common sense” doesn’t hold up. The most obvious point is that the F-4 was designed to be a Navy jet and later adapted to the Air Force. It’s easier to remove weight from a Navy jet than to add more structures to an Air Force one — or create a “super-system” from scratch. The TFX was supposed to be the jack of all trades: fighter, bomber, interceptor, nuclear capable, etc. The all-weather terrain following radar was cool, but really heavy.

The conversation continues:

Sen. Jackson: I am raising the specter of a defect in your planning system when demonstrably and obviously the planning did not take into account the most basic needs and requirements of the various Services, the Navy in particular, in the design of this machine. This isn’t criticism of TFX. It isn’t criticism of the Army, Air Force, or Navy. It is a question about the design efficiency of the system which analyzed the problem and led to the judgment.

 

Dr. Enthoven:. Senator, I am handicapped by not having as much knowledge and experience as you in that particular area. [Laughter.]

 

Senator BAKER. You are in bad shape. That is the most distressing news I have heard. [Laughter]

 

Dr. Enthoven: The points that you claim to be obvious are just not obvious. The points you are talking about are terribly complex matters of judgment on which reasonable men can differ. But I can assure you that the Navy has in the past year carried out a detailed, extensive evaluation of the F-111 versus all other possible approaches, and has come to the conclusion that for the job of Fleet Air Defense for which it was intended it is the best choice.

Again, Enthoven looks like a fool here. His own claims are the non-obvious ones: that McNamara and systems analysis had nothing to do with the TFX; that it was “common sense” that a joint aircraft was the right solution; that the TFX would meet Navy requirements. In all three of these cases, Enthoven was wrong.

The biggest issue at the time was whether the Navy was going to pull out all-together from its F-111B variant. Enthoven claimed the Navy reaffirmed the F-111 solution. But the next year, the Navy backed out and started the F-14 program! The Air Force followed through with the F-111, but dramatically reduced the buys and moved onto the F-15 and later the F-16.

This all reminds me of a quote from a CW Borklund article in 1967 (that I transcribed from microfiche at the Pentagon several years back): “We are haunted by the spectre of over-study in weapon needs; while at the same time much of the influencing analysis and basic knowledge upon which weapon development decisions are founded is superficial and shallow.”

This is vividly apparent in today’s acquisition programs as it was in the TFX. Years of study, requirements, designs, consensus-building — and yet the basis for such analyses rest of the most superficial and shallow thinking by people who will just move right on to the next program analysis.

By the way, this paradox of over-study and superficial thinking is exactly why PPBE Reform is an imperative in the Department of Defense.