The archaic defense budget process based on five-year plans, long decision making and excessive time to revenue keeps the most innovative companies from ever wanting to partner with the US government. There are no pathways to prosperity dealing with the DOD, only a series of “Valleys of Death” waiting for funding to be programmed in three years hence.
While there now are acquisition, contracting, and requirements pathways that have been created to try and bridge these valleys, without funding flexibility they are effectively useless and even counter-productive when they create a false sense of hope.
That was Bill Greenwalt in Breaking Defense. I couldn’t agree more: unless PPBE is tackled all the other reforms that have happened since 2015 have been for naught. And here is Thomas Spoehr and Fred Bartels at War on the Rocks:
Created in the 1960s, the PPBE system is based on the rational design model, then a state-of-the-art technique for organizational management. That model relies on predictability and consistency of outputs. The approach works just fine for a mid-century automotive factory producing a narrow number of car models with limited color choices. However, in defense matters, predictability and consistency were barely a thing in the past, let alone in the contemporary world. Game-changing technological advances come rapidly nowadays. Witness China’s recent unanticipated test of a fractional orbit bombardment system — or how the military is struggling with its adoption of cloud computing even though it is commonplace in civil society.
They have some recommendations for the Commission. And there’s third article in The Hill from Ronald Marks that I think missed the point, but here’s a slice:
For 15 years, I have lectured military executives about the current PPBE process — built by Defense Secretary Robert McNamara in 1961. It takes me up to 40 hours to cover the basics, and — despite best intentions (and I hope good teaching) — the complexity of the system leaves bright and intelligent DOD managers confused and frustrated. Congress is right: Something needs to be done. But what?
PPBE is such a massively important concept that touches every part of acquisition that it is really difficult to explain. No, it is not about the financial management community. Yes, it is about weapons choice and the decision-making process. Unfortunately, the PPBE at its core believes that financial leaders are in the best position to make technical and military decisions related to programs. It sort of entwined the two. I think Rickover had the right idea when he argued:
… it is my opinion that the OSD Comptroller’s organization should have nothing to do with identification, selection, and justification of specific military requirements. The Comptroller’s function should be to advise the Secretary of Defense as to the availability of funds, not whether a specific weapon system is or is not needed.
Too many people without the knowledge or responsibility get into the act on deciding the future of military power. PPBE reform is fundamentally about who makes choices and how they are held accountable.
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