Here is a GAO report on the implementation of DOD acquisition reform, including: (1) delegation of Major Defense Acquisition Programs from OSD control to the services, and (2) Middle-Tier acquisition programs which allows for rapid prototyping and fielding by streamlining the requirements (JCIDS) and 5000.01 processes.
Members of Congress have been concerned that DOD’s weapons acquisition process is too bureaucratic and slow to deliver innovations to the field. Recent legislation included reforms to try to speed up the process.
DOD has begun to carry out these reforms, including shifting more oversight decisions from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to the military departments and using a more streamlined process in some cases. However, questions remain about oversight roles and how some reforms will be implemented.
DOD also began using new pathways referred to as middle-tier acquisition to rapidly prototype and field new weapon systems. Middle-tier programs are expected to field capabilities within 2 to 5 years. As of March 2019, military departments were using this authority for 35 unclassified programs (see table).
DOD has yet to fully determine how it will oversee middle-tier acquisition programs, including what information should be required to ensure informed decisions about program selection and how to measure program performance. Without consistent oversight, DOD is not well positioned to ensure that these programs—some of which are multibillion dollar acquisitions—are likely to meet expectations for delivering prototypes or capability to the warfighter quickly.
It is interesting how much more the Air Force embraced Middle-Tier authorities for their programs than the Army and Navy. Many of the Air Force programs using these authorities are continuations of existing programs, like F-22 upgrades, B-52 engine replacement, FAB-T, GPS MGUE, AOC, and others. The follow-on program to SBIRS, which was way over cost and behind schedule, is also using these rapid prototyping authorities (which, for satellites, rapid prototyping seems equate to rapid full-scale development and eventual fielding…).
Here are some of the continuing disagreements at the highest levels:
Cost, fielding, and performance goals. Despite the issuance of policy by the Deputy Secretary of Defense in November 2018 on the establishment of cost, fielding, and performance goals, military department officials have continued to express concerns that the process is too burdensome and involves too many stakeholders from the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
Independent technical risk assessments. Debates about who should conduct independent technical risk assessments were elevated to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Subsequently, the Deputy Secretary issued guidance in December 2018 to reiterate that the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering would conduct or approve these assessments for all major defense acquisition programs, although that responsibility may be delegated. However, despite the issuance of new guidance, there continue to be ongoing debates about when assessments will be delegated to the military departments.
Middle-tier acquisition. Office of the Secretary of Defense and military department officials also disagree on the extent to which the Office of the Secretary of Defense should weigh in on the appropriateness of a program using a middle-tier pathway.
Not surprisingly, the GAO’s recommendation is to “identify the types of information needed” and to “clarify the roles and responsibilities” of OSD and the services. In other words, “we recommend that you (Department of Defense) hurry up and figure this implementation thing out!”
One of the important parts of Middle-Tier acquisition is that it does not provide authorities for programs to by-pass the DODI 5000.02, which includes many burdensome regulations which are owned by stakeholders throughout OSD. Some of these processes at the OSD level have attempted to accelerate approval for Middle-Tier, to avoid being called a roadblock. But inevitably, numerous bureaucratic processes will fall on each and every Middle-Tier program (particularly resource control under the PPBE process, perhaps the most burdensome of all).
Thus, no matter what the outcome of these programs will be in 2 or 5 years, it is unlikely that we will be able to attribute success or failure to the reforms per se. There was simply too many other confounding factors in the “Big A” acquisition process to know whether Middle-Tier made a difference, and most of these programs are new increments of legacy programs or programs that have already gone through many years of consensus-building throughout the bureaucracy (like hypersonics). Also, it is likely that one problem or another will force OSD to re-exert its oversight, and thus we will never gleam the results of this reform “experiment”.
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