Does DoD need a public relations campaign for mobilizing industry?

In a previous post, I discussed how Assistant Secretary for War Mobilization Louis Johnson had traveled the country prior to World War II making hundreds of speeches about defense production needs. He created a consensus around voluntary coordination of production plans in the event of war — even in advance of Germany’s invasion of Poland. 20,000 plants committed to doing their part and Johnson generated a giant directory. It is worth reiterating that was all voluntary, in line with American values.

War mobilization of industry does not happen overnight. This kind of preparation and foresight is integral. This kind of energy is what is required today. Germany and Japan would have launched their actions regardless of American preparation. We don’t know what will happen in the 2020s, but the risk is too high to continue the status quo.

Here’s another story from the official War Production Board history of World War II industrial mobilization. Again, these efforts got started before the United States entered the war.

During November and December 1941, three “Defense Special Trains,” gaudily painted in red, white, and blue, toured the country displaying some 60,000 component parts and small items—bits and pieces. Odium called them—to 50,000 manufacturers; and trucks carried the exhibits where the trains could not go. Permanent exhibits were set up in major cities, together with “industrial clinics” where the interested parties could get together to talk over their problems; and bulletins, booklets, and manuals were distributed through the field offices.

That is a proper application of imagination and “can do” spirit. Often, production of military end items are slowed down due to single points of failure in the supply chain. Proactive work on these issues can help move the whole system along. Consider the rapid increase in aircraft in ship product in the six quarters leading up to Pearl Harbor (below).

The big three auto manufacturers, by the way, agreed on August 20, 1941 to reduce production by 6.5% in the next quarter, followed by decreases of 38.7%, 51.4%, and 62% relative to the production in the previous year. This curtailment of civilian production was largely due to a material conservation concern, but also led to some unemployment which, from the perspective of the Office of Production Management, helped convert labor and industry to military requirements.