Here is a good segment from NPS Professor Judson after introducing all the process and people challenges of defense acquisition. It comes from a 1975 series of hearings, Major Weapons Acquisition:
The final characteristic is that the cumulative effect of all these efforts to control suppliers runs a great danger of converting that portion of the private sector, which is serving Government system needs to a quasi-nationalized segment of our economy. I think that is a terrible price to pay for perpetuating our misunderstanding about the acquisition process, and how we ought to control it.
Already by 1975, almost all aspects of today’s defense acquisition system existed. That system is so distinct from the commercial sector that it is only natural that the industrial sector would branch off. And with government also playing a major role in product design, investment, pricing, it is natural for the industry to be characterized as quasi-nationalized. What is strange about DoD acquisition is that government is simultaneously the invester, buyer, end-user, and regulator of everything.
Obviously that’s the way it will always be. But government can’t compel the free enterprise of its citizens (in the United States), and so it has to incentivize industry to work with it. Instead of forcing industry to adopt its unique rules, DoD must consciously starting thinking: Even if DoD is a government bureaucracy, how can it act commercially?
One thing professor Judson said during the hearing was that up to his remarks in 1975, DoD had been able to start new things before justifying them. Even after introduction of the modern three pillars of acquisition: PPBS, requirements, and the milestone decision process.
Over the next two years, additional front end controls were added, including a milestone zero, that made it so documentation had to be complete before starting a new effort. And thus, the problem of too much competition became the problem of too little transition.
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