Here is David Soergel, an industry consultant testifying to Congress in the 1975 hearing, “Major Systems Acquisition.”
Sometimes new technology can offer solutions to problems no one knows about. These are so-called “technology push” programs characterized as “solutions looking for problems”… If the Government continues the habit of telling the private sector the solutions, or a preferred way to solve a national need, we’re going to waste the vast creative resources of the country-make them just operating extensions of Government.
It is important to emphasize that the design is a subjective design. A different design group, having different past experiences, would most likely create an obviously different concept to solve the same problem…
Another point should be made here. I mentioned that two independent design teams will come up with different conceptual designs to solve a common problem, but only if they are given freedom to do so. This means that one team is automatically in competition with the other. And if this competition means that one team economically survives and the other doesn’t. Their selection of technologies will take into account the price of their proposals. They don’t need to be told that a future buyer will pay any price to solve his problem or to satisfy his needs.
What was needed was a policy framework to handle our lack of stable and precise knowledge about the problem, and to contractually cope with technical difficulties of each candidate solution without bankrupting contractors or embarrassing agencies.
It’s funny how the acquisition conversation hasn’t really changed all that much in 50 years. When McNamara left the SecDef position at the Pentagon and the Melvin Laird/David Packard team arrived, they emphasized austere prototype competitions — the “fly before you buy” approach. However, this was quickly abandoned when leadership changed over, and James Schlesinger couldn’t really keep it going.
By the mid-1970s, you had calls from GAO and others to install a Milestone Zero where months or years of scrutiny would befall any technology or requirement prior to concept development. Something like a Materiel Development Decision today. After that, Milestone I (or Milestone A today) is the decision point to initiate prototyping. That bureaucracy at the very front end would then limit and potentially destroy any novel ideas before the thought of prototyping was a twinkle in the entrepreneur’s eye.
Luckily Milestone Zero was dropped, but the desire for dozens of offices to get involved very early remained. Bureaucrats believe that if enough people analyze the problem with enough data, then what results has to be optimal. That consensus gives Congress the warm-and-fuzzy to actually fund it — the appearance of knowledge and certainty.
But I think the point Soergel makes is that what turns out to be the “right” system design with hindsight is never objectively true to all participants beforehand. You cannot innovate by committee, particularly when the committee relies of aggregated, messy data as is the case in most DoD analyses.
All the information on the best solution is not equally available to unengaged or transient bureaucrats. If it was, then there would be no such thing as a startup. The largest firms would continue to grow and dominate because their corporate bureaucracies could foresee disruptive innovations, changes to consumer tastes, and so forth. I’m sure every government official recognizes that point, but is unwilling to take it to the logical conclusion.
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