DoD acquisition personnel effectively leveraged the MTA [middle tier of acquisition] pathway for all 11 of the programs we reviewed to rapidly develop prototypes and field proven technologies to the warfighter as intended by DoD guidance. Acquisition personnel effectively leveraged the MTA pathways because DoD Acquisition Executives encouraged and supported the use of the MTA pathways, and Program Executive Offices (PEOs) and Program Managers used the flexibilities provided by the MTA pathways.
… As a result, DoD programs embraced the shift in acquisition culture and increased use of the MTA pathways. For the programs we reviewed, use of the MTA pathways increased efficiencies and effectiveness by streamlining acquisition processes, and expediting prototyping and fielding efforts. Because the MTA programs are still in the early stages of execution and DoD acquisition reform is still a work in progress, the DoD must continue to balance management and oversight of these programs with the risk involved.
That was from the DoD Inspector General report, Audit of the Department of Defense Middle Tier of Acquisition.
Of the 11 programs the DoDIG looked at, six of them had allocated the Decision Authority to the PEO level or equivalent. The Army’s service acquisition executive retained the Decision Authority for all four of it’s MTA programs, but delegated its authority to the PEO level. The only program not delegated was the F-15EX, which was retained by the Air Force’s SAE.
Note that the “Decision Authority” is a separate term and function from the “Milestone Decision Authority” that existed in regulations before and now only pertains to the Major Capability pathway.
There’s also this:
As of September 30, 2020, there were 18 of 69 MTA programs on the test and evaluation oversight list. Additionally, 3 of the 11 programs that we reviewed, NGSW, F-15EX, and Standard Missile-6 Block 1B were under DOT&E oversight… as of August 2021, DoD had 101 planned or active MTA programs.
One of the sticking points in the past was a lack of reporting and knowledge about the status of MTA programs. DoDIG found that all 11 MTA programs it looked at had complied with reporting requirements, and some even provided more information than required.
Earlier this year, the GAO’s annual weapons systems assessment had a section titled: DOD Has Yet to Fully Determine Its Oversight Approach for New Acquisition Guidance. Perhaps DoD acted quickly on those recommendations. But one thing in the GAO report that still seems important is the problematic definition of a “program of record.” If programs may now be split among multiple acquisition pathways, then how are data reported and tracked for performance? For example, “the Navy’s Conventional Prompt Strike capability—a submarine-launched, intermediate-range, hypersonic missile capability—was expected to comprise at least two MTA rapid prototyping efforts and an MTA rapid fielding effort.”
I think the rise of the Adaptive Acquisition Framework and renewed focus on portfolio management means that the concept of a “program of record” is no longer useful. No longer should a program be static, not interacting with any other program, have a completely deterministic baseline, and so forth. More contextual metrics and cultivation of optionality needs to be injected. After all, what matters is delivery of an integrated capability to the force structure. What does not matter is achieving zero cost-schedule growth to a fixed, but possibly erroneous, set of requirements.
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