Most cruisers and destroyers in today’s fleet carry between 90 and 122 VLS [vertical launch system] cells. Although the LCS does not carry the VLS, the new Constellation class frigate will carry 32 cells, and the Navy wants the large unmanned surface vessel (LUSV) to carry 16 or 32 cells (the exact number is still to be determined). Under the 2022 plan, the Navy would reduce the number of large surface combatants and increase the number of small surface combatants and, presumably, the number of unmanned surface vessels carrying missiles.
… As a result of those changes (and CBO’s assumptions about how those changes would be implemented), more surface combatants and unmanned systems would carry VLS cells, but the total number of VLS cells would be smaller (see Figure 2). Specifically, today’s surface combatant force carries about 9,300 VLS cells on 92 ships. (The 7 cruisers the Navy wants to retire this year carry 122 cells each, for a total of 854 cells.) If the Navy built the future objective force to the low end of the ranges in the 2022 plan and put only 16 VLS cells on the LUSVs [large unmanned surface vessels], the surface force would carry about 7,100 VLS cells on 113 ships and unmanned vessels (about 24 percent fewer missiles in a fleet with 23 percent more platforms than today’s fleet). If, instead, the Navy built to the high end of the ranges in the 2022 plan and put 32 VLS cells on the LUSVs, the force would carry about 9,100 missiles on 155 ships and unmanned vessels (about 3 percent fewer missiles in a fleet with 68 percent more ships than today’s fleet). Thus, the overall firepower of the force would be less than it is today, but many more ships would carry that firepower.
That was another good CBO report on the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan, this time for FY 2022. CBO is keeping it fresh, the last report on the Dec. 2020 shipbuilding plan featured inventory charts by ship class over time. The report previous to that was the first to include O&S estimates. This current report provides an analysis of VLS cells.
I suppose the Navy’s shipbuilding plan is consistent with distributed maritime operations. Dispersing firepower has its benefits even if the total mass of fires is reduced. Yet the real question is how these systems can be used in an operational context, including acquisition of targeting data, assigning shooters, and doing the numerous tasks required to close that kill chain. Analysis tends to measure ships and VLSs because they are easily counted. Here is Chris Dougherty on the FPRI Chain Reaction podcast:
I think a lot of discussion when you talk about navies is this symmetrical navy vs. navy context. How many ships do we have? If you get slightly more nuanced, you discuss how many vertical launch cells — how many missiles — can each side launch. Or maybe a discussion about tonnage. You might have a lot of small ships that might not have the mission capabilities of larger ships.
Even then, tonnage is a very rough proxy for capability. I’d like to have all the capabilities of an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer in something the size of a coast guard cutter, but that’s just not technically feasible yet. One could imagine with autonomy and advanced electronics, the weight of a ship can come down significantly while actually improving capabilities. But again, that takes contextual understanding of the technology and CONOPS. This intertemporal comparison is similar to comparing different navies and their unique states of technology.
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