“One of the things that we’re trying to do out of our office is to think about: How would we manage by portfolio as opposed to by program of record?” Barnes said Aug. 3 at the Sea-Air-Space conference.
… The change was the No. 1 recommendation in the report last year to lawmakers.
While such a move would be unusual within the military services, it’s not unprecedented. The Space Rapid Capabilities Office budgets by portfolio, while in the intelligence community, the National Reconnaissance Office does the same thing, said Barnes.
In its 2020 report, the Air Force asserted that a move to portfolio budget management would not require legislation, but it would need buy-in from lawmakers.
That was from a talk Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration Shawn Barnes gave at the Sea-Air-Space symposium.
The article discusses portfolios like “missile warning” and being able to move funds across program stovepipes. It also implies easily moving funds between organizations contributing to the portfolio like the Space RCO, the Space Development Agency, and the National Reconnaissance Office.
But that is a different kind of portfolio than portfolios currently given to the Space RCO and SDA which are organizationally based rather than mission/capability based. That may seem like a small nit pick, but perhaps is the key element to the success of failure of portfolio management in the Space Force. Indeed, if you create a “missile warning” portfolio, do you not simultaneously destroy SDA’s portfolio?
A “missile warning” portfolio — if it is inclusive — should include funding that will be distributed to all space organizations working on missile warning. For example, Next-Gen OPIR is worked out of PEO Development, SBIRS High is in PEO Production, missile tracking layer is being worked out of the SDA, AFRL also has missile warning S&T work, and those are just the programs/orgs off the top of my head. Then there are other potential organizations that contribute outside the Department of the Air Force like Missile Defense Agency and Army PEO Missiles and Space.
Such a portfolio that cross-cuts several independent organizations may be able to move funds without congressional reprogramming, but would still be an administrative nightmare. Under what process would a Space Force missile warning dollar be allocated to any one organization/program? If the SDA thinks its effort is imperative and needs additional funding, it might find itself in a food fight with PEO Development who considers its own systems to be the imperative. This cannot be adjudicated by the Space Systems Commander, because SDA is still not under his cognizance. This draws authority away from leaders responsible for execution and gives them a reason to blame others for failure.
Aligning budget portfolios with major performing organizations makes the most sense administratively. Capability portfolios that do not align with organizations creates major risks to acquisition. You can find a more detailed critique of Space Force portfolio management here, and alternative structures here.
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