The combination of congressional limitations and DOD inflexibility undermine any effort to transfer funds rapidly, from a hi-tech program that appears to be going nowhere to one that is far more promising. The rigidity of the system also renders it more difficult for organizations such as the Defense Innovation Unit to transfer funds from disappointing or slowly developing commercial programs to those of greater military promise that also offer more rapid introduction in the field.
If Congress is as serious as it claims to be about ensuring that America secures and maintains the lead over China and Russia in artificial intelligence and other high-technology applications for military operations, it should revisit and revise those seemingly arcane budget rules that stifle innovation and military modernization.
That was Dov Zakheim, Reform the Pentagon’s budget process, or lose our military and tech advantages. You can find more from Zakheim in the Center’s recent PPBE event. The major difference I have with him is that, in my estimation, Zakheim’s emphasis is on increasing reprogramming, transfer, and new start authority within the existing paradigm of program choice and oversight. My emphasis is on reclassification of the program element and even appropriation structure, and fundamentally improve program choice and oversight.
Technology development practices in the commercial sector have changed since the PPBE was created. No longer are products fully specified in a baseline plan and simply executed upon in a linear progression. The program element structure, the appropriations and RDT&E budget activities, the concept of the APB and lifecycle cost estimate, these things are at odds with the commercial sector and will stifle DoD’s ability to adopt and adapt.
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