Possibly the biggest challenge to experimentation is securing funding for the experiment or to apply the recommendations resulting from the experiment. When the initiation of a prototyping project is stymied or the developed prototype never makes it past the “valley of death” due to inappropriate or unavailable funds, the transformative effect of prototyping can be lost. In its report, “Weapon Systems: Prototyping Has Benefited Acquisition Programs, but More Can Be Done to Support Innovation Initiatives” (GAO-17-309), GAO points out that DoD’s funding structure and budget process create challenges both for obtaining funding to start projects and for transitioning projects to the acquisition domain at the conclusion of the project.39 DoD’s rigid funding structure regulates the type of technology development that an organization can pursue.
Likewise, DoD’s Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process makes it difficult for prototyping projects to obtain necessary funding when it’s needed. The PPBE process takes nearly two years from the time a funding need is identified to the time funding is available. In the fast-paced world of technology development, this lag in funding can prevent the timely development and deployment of a capability needed to address an emerging threat. DoD is working on developing a more strategic approach to funding innovation. Until that is in place, however, Congress has provided authorities and funded some accounts outside of acquisition programs that can be tapped into for prototyping projects. The following is a summary of some of the funding vehicles and DoD offices that can be looked into as potential funding sources for their prototyping projects.
Tell it like it is. That was from the Department of Defense Prototyping Handbook (Oct. 2019). USD(R&E) published the document and has clearly diagnosed the problem. However, I think USD(R&E) doesn’t (1) have the clout to adequately address the PPBE problem; and (2) have a clear mental model for what specific fixes are required. The document pointed to a couple flexible funding accounts, including the now defunct Rapid Prototyping Fund and Rapid Innovation Fund. Why didn’t those succeed?
In my view, a bigger and better Rapid Innovation Fund wouldn’t seem to solve the systemic problems facing experimentation and transition of weapon systems. The very concept of a program of record and the ways we measure performance needs to be tackled.
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