According to a memo sent from Roper to the Air Force’s acquisition workforce Tuesday, the chief architect will remain responsible for codifying ABMS [Advanced Battle Management System’s]’ technical requirements, overseeing on-ramp exercises, and approving the overall architecture and digital standards for the system.
Meanwhile, the Rapid Capabilities Office program executive has been tasked with conducting an audit of the program over the next 90 days, which will detail all efforts, contracts and resources associated with ABMS. That will inform the ABMS acquisition strategy, where the program office will lay out what it plans to buy and when that tech will be procured…
That was from C4ISR Net, “To bring ABMS over the finish line, US Air Force turns to the office responsible for stealth bombers and space planes.”
Regularization
This organizational change is a pretty big deal. In some ways, it looks like the Air Force is regularizing ABMS into a program of record — albeit, not too regularized because the Rapid Capabilities Office has streamlined reviews and a board of directors. But readers of this blog will remember that earlier this year, AF acquisition chief William Roper spoke very differently about the program:
The thing we’re going to have to show is that we can deconstruct a major effort like this — not run it like a major defense acquisition program — have everything come together seemlessly… I want 10-15% solutions that allow us to learn faster. ABMS won’t deliver, it will emerge.”
While the RCO is the best place to keep ABMS fast-moving and dynamic, I think it does represent a significant step towards bringing the program into the fold. Compared to the 10-15% solutions Roper asked for in March 2020, by November he talked about 70% solutions:
“I would rather have 70 percent of ABMS completed at a 100 percent level and be ready to be used operationally, than a hundred percent of ABMS completed at a 70 percent level,” he [Roper] said. “The RCO will have that task to meet.”
Of course, you can iterate 10-15% solutions to get to the 70% level, but I think Roper is being practical with his language and his approach.
Budget Woes
Readers will also remember that the FY21 budget request is the first big one for ABMS, hoping to go from $35.6 million in FY20 to $302 million for FY21. The House Appropriations Committee recommended cutting $50 million specifically from ABMS’ on-ramp exercises. The Senate Appropriations Committee went further, recommending a $93.5 million cut. The Senate also wants a full accounting of ABMS budget spread out across other program elements, which might be something like another $100 million or so. Here’s Roper on the situation:
It is the reality of this business that we are handed a budget that we don’t make, and we have to do our best job executing it. Rarely is there all the money that we said we needed to get the job done, so we prioritize across different programs.
Documentation
The Air Force is struggling to secure sizable funds for ABMS because it is taking a 21st century approach. Oversight agencies, however, want to see fixed requirements, a lifecycle cost estimate, and other industrial era reports. The Air Force will simply have to create their acquisition strategy and supporting documentation. They have no other choice. Here’s the C4ISR Net article again:
However, Congress has been more reticent to buy into the program, raising concerns about the service’s lack of an acquisition strategy and detailed requirements.
That the RCO will now delineate a more thorough acquisition plan for ABMS is a “happy coincidence,” Roper said, though he expects it will help alleviate some of Congress’ concerns about the program.
I think the RCO creating the necessary documentation is more than a “happy coincidence.” Some kind of fully costed requirement must be detailed if the program is to survive. Will the RCO target a 70 percent requirement and funding solution?
Let’s say that the RCO does its best to detail the 70% solution as the ABMS baseline. A few complications: (1) Would that constrain the agility of the ABMS program? (2) Would oversight agencies approve of that approach, knowing the Air Force will likely come back for more funding later? and (3) At the end of that 70% program, does ABMS get an updated original baseline, or does additional funding appear as cost growth?
It’s hard to imagine how ABMS gets away with a partial set of documentation. The RCO will have to be creative in framing the strategy and choosing the metrics. Hopefully it can do so without too many cooks entering the kitchen.
Chief Architect
Certainly, one of those cooks will be ABMS chief architect Preston Dunlap. It seems, however, that the more power the RCO has to define the acquisition strategy and real-time tradeoffs, the less power Dunlap has to architect the system. How much of the system’s architecture will be reflected in baseline requirements documents? Once that’s done, what’s the day-to-day impact of the chief architect?
It might seem that the ABMS chief architect will act something like Derek Tournear at the Space Development Agency, which is primarily an architect rather than a systems developer/buyer. But the SDA does some buying of systems, like data transport and missile tracking satellites, and requested a hefty $288 million for FY 2021.
It will be interesting to see what becomes of the ABMS chief architect. I suspect that Will Roper foresaw the position to be vulnerable in the Air Force after he left, and so transitioning most program responsibility to the RCO would ensure a champion. If the chief architect loses access to the acquisition executive, and then becomes funded out of the RCO’s ABMS program element, it will likely become a subordinate role.
Last Thought on Acquisition Reform
Notice that ABMS was able to get started and fielding capabilities without (1) requirements; or (2) milestone reviews. It seems that Roper had to pivot the program because of the budget process. Even though military programs can succeed without requirements or milestone reviews, they cannot succeed without money. If money cannot be obtained unless the requirements and milestone review processes are fulfilled, then defense leaders have no choice but to fall in line. This jeopardizes the entire reform agenda behind Roper’s approach to being agile. And this is why I bang the drum so much on the absolute necessity of budget reform.
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