Traditionally, the advanced military thinking on the improvement of weapons and on new methods of combat has been left to the lower echelons. The theory has been that any matter of sufficient importance will force itself up from below upon its merits, and demand the attention it deserves. There is, of course, a basis for this argument. Yet, the course of modern war is so largely determined by the evolution of new techniques that it is absolutely essential that first-class thinking be done which combines military considerations with the possibilities opened by technical progress. This thinking can only be done at the top. To proceed without it in a modern war is simply not good enough. Progress in complex technical matters is slow enough in the face of inertia, limited vision, obstinacy, vested position, tradition, and all the other ills that flesh is heir to without superimposing the organizational handcap of making new thinking fight its way to the attention of the top-level commanders who ought to be giving it affirmative consideration.
Let it be thought that this is merely a matter of generalities, examples can best be drawn from the First World War. The three great technical innovations of that war were tanks, poison gas, and aircraft. All three produced effects on the course of the war, yet these were essentially temporary and local. If sufficient grasp and vision had been present to see possibilities at the outset and prepare for full-scale surprise use thoroughly followed up, there is little doubt that the war could have been shortened, one way or the other.
Statement of Dr. Vannevar Bush, Director, Office of Scientific Research and Development. 26 January, 1945. “Hearings Before the Select Committee on Post-War Military Policy.” House of Representatives Seventy Eighth Congress, second session, pursuant to H. Res. 465: A Resolution to Establish a Select Committee of Post-War Military Policy. Part 1 of 1.
Notice he says “first-class thinking” needed to be done, presuming that only a very few can be first-class thinkers and that they must necessarily be at the top. Bush was the dean of MIT engineering before the WWII. I think he represented a general feeling of men at the top that there needed to be more top-down direction from men like themselves. The reason progress in science and technology wasn’t faster was because of the backwardness of the average folks in mid-level management that controlled many decisions.
Robert McNamara and his whiz kids were the ultimate expression of this view, and I think proved quite well that no matter how smart the leaders are, they can’t handle the deep complexities of vast organizations like the Department of Defense. The general trend of the 21st century seems to be training and empowerment of the lower levels, rather than centralization under the best and brightest. No one conceives of the world being planned by geniuses, where everyone else simply executes those plans, such as fashioning metal or riveting bolts.
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