Below are the DARPA’s current technical offices:
- Biological Technologies Office (BTO)
- Defense Sciences Office (DSO)
- Information Innovation Office (I2O)
- Microsystems Technology Office (MTO)
- Strategic Technology Office (STO)
- Tactical Technology Office (TTO)
Typically, a program will have specific technical objectives, a budget of tens of millions of dollars, and will last for three to five years. In many cases, an individual program will fund multiple R&D projects run by different performers, so as to test different technical ideas. Having a good set of diverse technical approaches early on in a program is helpful. Each DARPA technology office also can fund small “seed” programs, which provide a way for program managers to generate and test new ideas.
In recent years, each office also has run an annual “open” competition in which applicants can propose work in areas of technology not covered in the office’s programs. These “open” competitions help generate additional new ideas from the technical community. DARPA therefore uses a “portfolio” approach: it funds a wide range of R&D programs and also often funds multiple projects within a single program.
Its program managers are experts who make thoughtful decisions, but since the R&D focus is high-risk to achieve “high payoff” results, the outcomes are unpredictable and the agency and its program managers invest in a range of promising technologies. Some programs and projects will work while others will not.
However, by investing in a number of options, the agency seeks to increase the chances of success while accepting the inherent risk that some research may not succeed. DARPA itself does not build actual operational prototypes of new systems; it turns over “proof-of-concept” prototypes to other parts of the defense and commercial worlds—a process that DARPA calls “technology transition”.
That was from The DARPA Model for Transformative Technologies: Perspectives on the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.
I think most people agree that DARPA has a pretty productive culture. They would agree that it’s good for highly skilled PMs to choose their projects, use multiple competing paths, and take a portfolio view that focuses on high-“payoff” rather than high-“likelihood” projects. It looks rather like the VC model for early-stage companies.
But as the authors say, DARPA does “proof-of-concept” more than operational prototyping. The projects are relatively inexpensive. Certainly, full-scale prototypes of operational systems cannot be handled in such a free-wheeling way? They need process and control… or do they?
Some of DARPA’s greatest successes were from no-joke prototypes, like the Have Blue stealth demonstrator that led to the F-117A. That program reportedly cost just $35 million, or about $113 million in 2020 dollars. DARPA also pretty much developed UAV technology, flying the Amber, GNAT (Tier 1), and then Predator before transitioning around 1995. Sophisticated systems can get built for pretty low cost using the DARPA method.
That said, the definition of “prototype” is pretty fuzzy, as is it’s distinction from terms like “demonstrator.” Here’s another good part on DARPA’s flat organization:
Program managers need to be recruited and supervised. DARPA is able to do so using only two layers of management: office directors an their deputies and then the agency director and deputy director. Since these managers are themselves technically very well trained, they can make informed decisions quickly and competently.
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