A program has to achieve 40 milestone requirements just to pass Milestone A into the second major phase of a program, the Technology Maturation & Risk Reduction Phase. These 40 requirements includes conducting an Analysis of Alternatives, which is a comparison of other weapons that could potentially fill the same need; an Independent Cost Estimate, which helps decision-makers decide if the weapon is something they can afford to pursue (or what tradeoffs should be made if it’s not); and developing a Test and Evaluation Master Plan, which is essential to establish clear testing benchmarks to evaluate how the new weapon system performs in combat…
It is understandable that the services want to speed up the process of fielding new weapon systems. While there are many flaws in the current acquisition system, it is not the root of the problem.
That was from Dan Grazier over at POGO, “Dodging the Formal Acquisition Process“. There are three good case studies involving the M1A2, F-35, and B-21.
As readers of this blog know, I believe the root of the problem is the acquisition system. All the planning and approvals involved in over 40 requirements just to get past Milestone A is far too much. The assumption is that once the program gets authorized after Milestone A and gets a wedge in future budgets through the FYDP, the program is unstoppable. Only the worst calamity can stop a program, and it is often better to save face by stretching out the program than to cancel it. More funds get shoveled into what increasingly look like errors in hindsight.
Another assumption is that a program has to be a new and fully integrated platform. The cost of error is much less, and the burden of starting a development should be much lower, if we pursue component technologies independent of platform, providing an ecosystem of proven technologies to build from.
The formal acquisition process presumes that all programs are major revolutionary designs, or multi-mission platforms. It creates a bias against action when it comes to trail-and-error scaling of technologies into systems which may or may not have a precisely defined requirement. Sometimes you have to show the users something they didn’t expect, then iterate until it reaches an operational fit.
If the acquisition system were not the problem with stagnating defense technology, then the only culprit left is the acquisition workforce. This is indeed the claim of many, that the workforce doesn’t have the skills or incentives to execute well-known processes. That doesn’t sit well with me. It appears the other way around. People feel their creative contributions stymied by the acquisition system, and that inhibits their personal progress.
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