Programs like MBT-70, C-5A, and the F-111 get defended before Congress and the American public-whatever their problems in performance, cost, and schedule slippages-simply because the Services haven’t had alternatives they can bet on instead.
It’s like betting on one horse races-the winners, too often, turn out to be real losers. The ante’s especially expensive when the nag drops dead halfway down the track-like the Cheyenne and the F-111B.
The problem of one-horse races is very real in the Department of Defense. Indeed, this outcome has been encouraged by the hyper-rationalist foundations of defense acquisition, particularly since Robert McNamara. It requires actions to be fully planned before they are undertaken, reflecting explicit knowledge of how engineering and requirements interact.
The goal was to rationalize action during a long “contract definition” phase where the single-best concept would emerge. Follower progams that hedge against failure were, in a sense, an admission of an incomplete analysis of the the relevant alternatives. Further, hedging programs have the appearance of wasteful duplication, and points to managerial failings for not knowing the optimal course in advance. If the manager cannot assure a successful proect, then some other manager will gladly profess the required certainty to advance his career.
Consider a simple thought experiement. McNamara’s brain-child the F-111 sought to pursue multiple missions for the Air Force and Navy, for fighter roles, interdiction, attack, and nuclear bombing. This single program would require massive start up costs, leaving very little funding left over in tactical aviation.
The potential failure of the F-111 leaves vulnerable not just one mission, but multiple missions. There would need to be several single-mission hedging programs. Not only would that require years of justification to Congress to have the line items approved, it would have signaled that McNamara didn’t have all the answers to questions of weapons choice, which he professed to have using RAND’s quantitative methods of systems analysis and program budgeting.
The current system of defense acquisition has changed little since McNamara’s time. Managers are still expected to have fully costed plans with minimal risk due to lengthy requirements definition phases. We shouldn’t be surprised that one-horse races still dominate the Department of Defense.
Source: “No More One- Horse Races,” editorial, Armed Forces Journal, Nov. 22, 1969, p. 6. Found in theReport of the Committee on Government Procurement (1972), in “Hearings on Office of Management and Budget Circular A-109: Major System Acquisition Policy,” Before the Research and Development Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Ninety-Fifth Congress, First Session (Nov 1 and Dec 1, 7, 1977) and Second Session (Apr 6, 10, 14 and Sep 18, 1978).
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