During the 30 years that our company has been in existence… we have seen air vehicles advance front the 100- to 200-mile-per-hour speeds characteristic of the late twenties to the point where we now commonly state seed capabilities in multiples of tile speed of sound. It is difficult to realize the many ramifications of this progress, although some understanding of these things is essential to ally appraisal of the weapon system development concept and the conditions the at brought it into being.
I would like to present just it few examples of trends in air weapon development problems.
I won’t comment on that chart particularly , gentlemen. I will leave it there for reference, but it is an indication of the rapidity of technological progress. It is only one indication, I will say, but it might give you some index number that would be of value…
I would like to emphasize the growing need for integration and coordination among the various design teams that must solve those problems. Because of the close functional interdependence of all the components and subsystems that go into a modern weapon system, there Is need for extraordinary coordination from the earliest design concept down through tho entire engineering and development problem Generally speaking, we can no longer take a piece of equipment out of the catalog as in an earlier day of airplane development. I would like to show you an example. Here is a typical case of what we are having to do today.
Now, as an example of another kind of integration that is necessary as a result of performance progress, let us consider the matter of radar range.
Let me give you a better idea of the scope of technical effort required on present-day weapon system development projects, whether missiles or manned aircraft. Looking at only the effort expended by our company, here is a chart showing the trend over a period of 20 years in fighter and interceptor design.
You note we have recorded the engineering hours required for the P-51, the F-86A, the F-86D the F-100, and estimated for the F-108. This would be all engineering up to the 200 airplane delivery point. You can see for’yourself that the scale, is ascending at a geometric rate…
Bear in mind that this is a conservative representation of the trend, because it does not reflect the increase in engineering effort for equipment development-only the air vehicle effort.
Accompanying the increases in performance and technological effort has been a great increase in what we could call the “importance of being right.” That is to say, it becomes increasingly essential that we arrive at the optimum technical solution, because the penalty for being wrong or less than optimum rises sharply. This penalty can be felt in terms of impaired performance, reduced combat effectiveness, increased cost of procurement, and substantial delay in operational availability. Here is an example.
If we assume a loss in efficiency of 5 percent for reciprocating engine of conventional design, we lose 1 percent in the range of that machine. When we assume a 5 percent loss in efficiency of a turbojet engine on a subsonic cruising airplane, we experience a 2 percent loss of range. But when we go to supersonic cruise, such as m the B-70 or F-108 or some missiles, a 5 percent reduction in efficiency will cause a 21 percent loss in range at approximately three times the speed of sound.
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That was an excellent testimony to Congress from John Leland Atwood, President of North American Aviation in 1959. If you’d like a copy of the source below or images, feel free to contact me.
Source: WEAPONS SYSTEM MANAGEMENT AND TEAM SYSTEM CONCEPT IN GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING HEARINGS, BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE FOR SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES EIGHTY-SIXTH’ CONGRESS FIRST SESSION, UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF H. Res. 19. HEARINGS HELD APRIL 18, 14, 15, 21, 22, 29, 30, MAY 6, 8, JUNE , 4,5,9, 10, 1, 12,17, JULY 15,16,17, ‘AUGUST 20 AND 2, 1969.
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