The FFG(X) program is a Navy program to build a class of 20 guided-missile frigates (FFGs). The Navy wants to procure the first FFG(X) in FY2020, the next 18 at a rate of two per year in FY2021-FY2029, and the 20th in FY2030. The Navy’s proposed FY2020 budget requests $1,281.2 million for the procurement of the first FFG(X). The Navy’s FY2020 budget submission shows that subsequent ships in the class are estimated by the Navy to cost roughly $900 million each in then-year dollars.
In general, the Navy envisages the FFG(X) as follows:
- The ship is to be a multimission small surface combatant capable of conducting anti-air warfare (AAW), anti-surface warfare (ASuW), antisubmarine warfare (ASW), and electromagnetic warfare (EMW) operations.
- Compared to an FF concept that emerged under a February 2014 restructuring of the LCS program, the FFG(X) is to have increased AAW and EMW capability, and enhanced survivability.
- The ship is to be capable of operating in both blue water (i.e., mid-ocean) and littoral (i.e., near-shore) areas.
- The ship is to be capable of operating either independently (when that is appropriate for its assigned mission) or as part of larger Navy formations.
Given the above, the FFG(X) design will likely be larger in terms of displacement, more heavily armed, and more expensive to procure than either the LCS or an FF concept that emerged from the February 2014 LCS program restructuring.
That was from a Congressional Research Service report on the FFG(X) updated May 29, 2019, which I’ve posted here. So the Navy wants to fulfill a bunch of requirements with the FFG(X), basically the same that was promised from the LCS, but it wants to do it cheaply. The total ship system cost for the FFG(X) is expected to cost less than the hull of a DDG(51) Flight III alone. In the Navy’s mind, giving the prime contractor more freedom to meet the requirements will keep costs down:
The US Navy has historically selected US manufactured components for its major surface combatants and designated them as class standard equipment to be procured either as government-furnished equipment (GFE) or contractor-furnished equipment (CFE). In a major departure from that policy, the Navy has imposed no such requirement for the FFG(X), the Navy’s premier small surface combatant…
… unlike all major surface combatants currently in the fleet, the [Navy’s] draft RFP [Request for Proposals] for the FFG(X) does not identify specific major HM&E components such as propulsion systems, machinery controls, power generation and other systems that are critical to the ship’s operations and mission execution.
There is also no requirement to source these components from the US. Here’s their conclusion:
Therefore, lowest acquisition cost is likely to drive the award—certainly for component suppliers.
This, it is argued, puts the US suppliers at a disadvantage because foreign shipbuilders are directly subsidized by their governments, as well as having the benefit of larger commercial volumes to spread overhead costs. Another disadvantage for US firms, it might appear, is that the draft RFP does not highlight life-cycle (sustainment) costs, and no where are the costs of logistics systems, training, capitalizing repair, and other back-end considerations addressed, those areas of integration which US suppliers have more experience.
The procurement of the FFG(X) seems to be at high-risk, and if the Navy really tries to get the contractor to meet all the requirements on a low budget, there will likely have to be compromises. From the Navy’s wish list, a lot of the integration will likely be outside the comfort area of European firms, like “Organic MQ-8C” aviation, Consolidated Afloat Networks and Enterprise Services (CANES), a suite of anti-submarine systems, Cooperative Engagement Capability, and much more.
Lockheed Martin has already dropped out, it appears, from the FFG(X) competition, leaving two foreign firms and two domestic. Here’s a nice summary of that:
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