Gresham’s Law of Programming
Here’s a slice from the excellent Mark Mandeles’ book, The Development of the B-52 and Jet Propulsion. Between 1919 and 1926, the technical staff at […]
Mark Mandeles
The reason bureaucratic planning doesn’t resolve weapons risk
Navy leaders have known for a very long time about what chemist and philosopher Michael Polanyi called “tacit knowledge,” or knowledge that is difficult to […]
Was Eisenhower’s military-industrial speech a self-fulfilling prophecy?
Eisenhower was going to call this new animal the “military-industrial-congressional complex,” which most would agree today is a pretty accurate description of the system since […]
Air Force top priorities reflect a move away from stovepiped weapons
Back in June 2020, Air Force chief Charles Brown said his top priority was Joint All-Domain Command and Control. In November, Brown updated that slightly. […]
Creating high-reliability organizations in the Department of Defense
High-reliability organizations are an example of a topic that I believe has not received attention in military history. Sociologist Charles Perrow’s Normal Accidents was published […]
Mark Mandeles on organizing for technology growth
The second half of my conversation with Mark Mandeles has been released on all major podcast apps. In this episode Mark and I talk about […]
Mark Mandeles on system design principles
In this episode of Acquisition Talk, I speak with Mark Mandeles about a wide range of topics in defense management. Mark has had a fascinating career […]
Analyzing corporate welfare in defense
In a previous post, I argued that corporate welfare is a function of Government restrictions on supply, which raises barriers to entry and lowers the […]