Reducing uncertainty and discretion in development contracts
The market for defense R&D is imperfect and fails to provide a reliable mechanism by which the government can automatically secure performance at or near […]
C-5A
Proof that government is an unattractive customer
Even sticker-shock prices don’t always motivate companies. According to our estimates, more than 10,000 parts requests are delayed or unfilled each year despite our reluctant […]
The stifling rigidity of the Total Package Procurement (TPP) concept for contracting
In the mid-1960 successful development contracts were generally followed by production contracts with little or no likelihood that the contracts would have to face competition. […]
Fitzhugh’s take on task partitioning and fly-before-you-buy
If you break it down into smaller units and you have more contractors in the business… It is not so vital in that situation for […]
DOD pays a 3,233% overhead rate, but was it a bad deal?
The U.S. Air Force, faced with an aging aircraft fleet, is turning to 3D printing to dramatically cut down the time and cost of manufacturing […]
Monopsony, bailouts, and regulations — 3 problems of defense acquisition
In weapons systems acquisitions, however, there are three important differences in buyer-seller relationships: One, the buyer represents the only market, for the product and […]
Analyzing corporate welfare in defense
In a previous post, I argued that corporate welfare is a function of Government restrictions on supply, which raises barriers to entry and lowers the […]