Cutting contract documentation by 90+ percent
Here is Air Force general Chapman at a 1971 appropriations supplemental hearing with DepSecDef David Packard, asking for additional funds to do prototyping including funds […]
History
Does documentation eat up 50% of DoD acquisition dollars?
First, the overhead costs of manning the acquisition room are some place between 10 and 50 times what it would cost to proceed on a […]
Here’s how much in-house R&D the military services did in the 1960s
That was from a congressional hearing in July 1961.* I’m actually somewhat surprised that the Air Force performed upwards of 20 percent of their RDT&E […]
You can’t make decisions based on 40,000 pages of paper, McNamara was wrong
MCNEIL: … the budget system got pretty complicated under [Robert] McNamara. It took them years to wake up to the fact that he was not […]
DoD programs are over-analyzed, yet decisions remain superficial and shallow
I drop you into an exchange between Senator Scoop Jackson and Alain Enthoven, ASD Systems Analysis and one of McNamara’s ‘whiz kids,’ in a 1967 […]
First DoD Comptroller slams naive reformers who invented PPBS
Here’s DoD’s third Comptroller Charles Hitch testifying to Congress about the need for the new management system he was implementing in DoD: the Planning, Programming, […]
PMs spend too much time at briefings where no decisions are made
In the early 1970s, the Army took it upon itself to review its acquisition system. The AMARC report found that the Army was “profoundly affected” […]
Does acquisition depend too much on assumptions, not enough on accountability?
James Roherty’s classic 1970 book, The Decisions of Robert S McNamara has a pair of interesting discussions on the takeover of systems analysis on military […]
The role of line and technical officers in the Navy
When Congress established that position, it was clearly understood that the Chief of Naval Operations – the Navy’s highest-ranking military officer – was subordinate to […]
Why aren’t more acquisition offices run like Naval Reactors?
The Navy’s success since the 1950s in procuring and safely operating scores of nuclear-powered ships and in developing a succession of reactor designs using fuel […]
The process of military innovation — the case of continuous aim firing
One seemingly obvious innovation back a the turn of the 20th century which met heavy resistance within the Navy was an elevation system to keep […]
R&E chief tries to get a handle on the innovation ecosystem
“We’re looking across the entire DoD to look at all the different innovation activity that’s ongoing. I’d like to get my arms around just how […]
Why the defense industry competes for “required” systems where 80-90% of the cost is preset
Here is Robert J. Judson, Adjunct Prof at NPS, at a 1975 congressional hearing: You will see, if you look next at all of the […]
The damage to R&D caused by bureaucrats planning the creative process
Here’s a letter from Bill McClean, chief at Navy’s China Lake and led the Sidewinder development, to the deputy chief of Naval Operations: We find […]
Why is defense innovation so slow?
If a clever engineer imagines a new weapon for the Air Force, and if the research-and-development office specializing in that class of weapons approves of […]