After a flurry of major technological advancements in the 1940-1960s period, there was talk of a “technological plateau.” Proponents of this idea believed that most of the revolutionary discoveries had been found, and the future was primarily tackling small problems left over. Robert McNamara subscribed to this idea, and installed the Planning, Programming, Budgeting (PPB) System because he believed that controlling cost was more important than bringing new ideas to field.
For example, McNamara cancelled a nuclear-powered ramjet engine after $200 million (then year) was spent. Father of the hydrogen bomb Edward Teller said “I believe this is the biggest mistake we have made since the years following World War II when we failed to develop the ICBM.” McNamara could perhaps be attributed to cancelling more programs than he started, such as Dynasoar and Skybolt.
The PPBS relies on predicting the cost-schedule-performance of future technologies before program start. Thus, it relies on using historical data to drive future action. That means PPB has a bias for incremental change to legacy programs. Yet this “safe” approach, by pushing existing designs past their limits, invites cost and technical challenges. Unintuitively, it is the new technological paradigms that open up opportunities for 10 or 100-fold returns.
As scientist Hans Selye understood: ““… the more manifestly sensible and practical a research project, the closer it is to the commonplace we already know.“
Below, I list some of the most important technologies in defense weapons and bucket them into three categories:
(1) Incremental improvements on pre-PPB developed systems. For example, the Columbia-class submarine might have new efficiencies and computers, but it basically performs the same role as the Fleet Ballistic Missile started in the 1950s.
(2) Adopted irregularly, forced on the system, or developed internationally. For example, the Air Force played with UAVs, but it was the CIA that really adopted the Predator.
(3) Adopted by PPB itself. I’m sure there are major paradigms I’m missing there, but it is hard for me to think of them.
Adopted Prior to PPB paradigm
| Satellite imagery | Ballistic missiles | Radar | Infrared search/track |
| Jet engines | Electronic warfare | Sub launched IRBM | Nuclear ships |
| Hypersonic vehicle | Nuclear weapons | C-130/U-2/B-52 | Laser-guided bombs |
| Radios | Inertial navigation | Missile defense/Aegis | Helicopters |
| Supercruise | Digital photography | Microwave emission | Proximity fuzes |
| Pressurized aircraft | Automated gunnery (cybernetics) | Cruise missiles | Sonar |
Adopted Irregularly, Forced, or Outside of PPB
| UAVs | Night vision | Stealth/Low RCS | Ramjet |
| VTOL, thrust vectoring | Active armor protection | Helmet-mounted sight | Gyroscopic stabilization |
| Internet | Fly-by-wire | Satellite navigation |
Adopted By PPB
| Tiltrotor aircraft | F-22 | Electromagnetic launch | Swing-wing |
| Directed Energy (?) | Guidable rockets (?) |
* The tiltrotor aircraft V-22 took about 25 years to reach IOC and three rounds of development, due to PPB and requirements interference that nearly ruined the entire concept. See Richard Whittle: The Dream Machine.
* F-22 was the first production aircraft to combine supercruise, supermaneuverability, stealth, and sensor fusion, but did not invent any of those aspects and took 25 years to IOC.
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