Here are some excerpts from the Data section of our newest report, Execution Flexibility and Bridging the Valley of Death. First, we have a figure on the sum-total of possible sources of tech transition funding in the FY 23 RDT&E title. Overall, we found roughly $7 billion in the FY22 enactment, which is about 6.6% of RDT&E and less than one percent of the entire DoD budget.
Note that not all of these sources are actually useful for technology transition. The SBIR/STTR bucket which is the largest is not designed for technology transition. SBIR/STTR funds do not support Phase III transitions, only the proofs of concept. The second largest bucket, the Offices, can often transition new technologies but are often pipelined for specific capabilities. And the software pilot BA 8 only supports DevSecOps, not transition.
Let’s break out a couple of these other areas:
“Core” Sources
“Core” sources of transition funding are those subjectively selected by this study that are best suited to funding new efforts in the year of execution. While funds have come, gone, and evolved over time, the current base of programs like JCTD and Emerging Capabilities Technology Development (ECTD) evolved from the ACTD program created in 1995.
All the “core” funds are held by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and have competitive proposal processes that can range several months to more than year. The programs tend to be oversubscribed. For example, the Rapid Tech Transition Office, which manages the ECTD, Quick Reaction Special Projects (QRSP), and Rapid Prototyping Program (RPP), had 836 companies apply in 2019 and only 38 selected for follow on discussions. In FY 2022, USD R&E initiative for RDER received “thousands” of submissions, 200 “decent” proposals, and 32 selections. The selected projects are then executed by the service program offices.
While Congress has tended to add funds to the PB request for these “core” sources, the loss of the RPF and RIF in FY 2020 has left a deficit that APFIT and RDER are attempting to fill in FY 2023.
“Secondary” Sources
“Secondary” sources are those funds that provide flexibility in the year of execution, but are not designed or optimized for transitioning efforts into programs of record. For example, while ManTech funds are flexible, they are generally programmed as part of component budget submissions, undermining this flexibility.
Service Non-Program of Record
While Budget Activities 6.1 to 6.3, generally referred to as the S&T accounts, are not tied to acquisition programs of record, generally BA 6.4 prototyping efforts are. The services have designated program elements that are not tied to programs of record.
For example, the Army’s TMI program is its only non-program of record BA 6.4 effort. Selection of projects within the TMI is overseen by a two-star Technology Maturation Executive Steering Group. The Air Force similarly has a sizable Tech Transition program element. The “Experimentation Campaign” project in FY 2021 included $81.5 million and was justified broadly, stating that “specific plans are not detailed to prevent locking into an approach that will likely shift.” This language was removed in FY 2022 in favor of more detailed justifications.
Conclusion
Overall, the sources of year-of-execution flexibility to transition new technologies is quite limited. Most of these sources aren’t really optimized for the task. Those that are can be highly bureaucratic and take a year or more to go through the application process. Only small dollars are received.
If there’s a proven technology that comes from company IR&D, the labs, SBIR, or commercial, for the most part it will have to wait 3-5 years before the consensus can be built, fit into the budget request, and then approved by four committees of Congress. These niche funds will not be able to solve a systemic problem in DoD.
Leave a Reply