Accountability and authority in project management

Here’s an interesting discussion from economist and entrepreneur Arnold Kling:

Accountability and authority ought to be proportional to one another. If you have authority without accountability, then you are in a position to abuse power. If you have accountability without authority, then you are probably being set up to fail.

 

The position of “project manager” in an organization often comes with no formal authority but with a lot of accountability. Projects typically require work by people from different parts of the organization. You have no formal authority, because the people on your project team report to their line bosses—you may have no direct input into their compensation. But top management expects the project to be completed.

 

I have come to admire great project managers. I would argue that they are intrinsically set up to fail, but the best ones nonetheless succeed. Project managers must have both analytical ability and outstanding people skills…. Project management aside, if I told you that a prospective boss liked to hold you accountable but would not give you authority, you probably would say “That’s crazy. I don’t want to be set up to fail. I’ll pass on that job.”

The 1986 Packard Commission report and the subsequent Goldwater-Nichols Act were supposed to place authority and accountability in the hands of the Program Manager, who had a short line of reporting through the Program Executive Officer (PEO) and the Service Acquisition Executive (SAE). Unfortunately, these PMs often are accountable for meeting cost-schedule-performance targets, but they don’t have the authority to make significant tradeoff decisions themselves. The functional support staff of the PM also have separate bosses and instructions. The PM is in many cases set up to fail, handed someone else’s program plan. The PM expects to leave before the program is delivered or moves onto the next phase.

• The PM does not have acquisition authority (maybe delegated to PEO but usually SAE).
• The PM does not have contracting authority (maybe delegated to the contracting officer but often requiring layers of approval).
• The PM does not have requirements authority (owned by JCIDS or similar offices).
• The PM cannot hand pick their staff (unless it is a rapid capabilities office).
• The PM has no authority over money (but can make requests through action officers and the SAE).

The only place all of those above authorities are integrated in one place is essentially the Service Secretary or the Deputy Secretary of Defense. While these individuals at the tippy-top have all the authority they need, they don’t have the on-the-ground knowledge to make the best use of decisions. Nor do they have accountability for their actions because they are way too high up the food chain.

Kling discusses how low accountability and low authority looks like the Department of Motor Vehicles, or workers on American auto assembly lines in the 1970s. By contrast, Japanese auto makers gave their workers authority and accountability for product quality and could stop the assembly line to fix problems. Yet what he finds happens in government bureaucracies, non-profit sectors, and activists is the dangerous combination of strong authority and weak accountability.