Here is Dmitri Alpervitch, co-founder of the largest cybersecurity firm in the world Crowd Strike, in a viral twitter thread:
There are numerous signals that Russia has sent recently that make me believe invasion is almost certain, as well as a substantial number of reasons for why this is the preferred route for Putin.
Signal: The obvious one. The military build-up on Ukraine’s borders (in the north, east and south in Crimea). This mobilization is qualitatively and quantitatively different from the past.
75% of Russia’s total battalion tactical groups have been moved. Artillery, air defense units, tanks, APCs, bridge-laying equipment, mine clearers, armored excavators, engineering equipment, refueling, huge amount of logistics, etc. Follow @RALee85 for details.
Signal: Cyber prep. Since early December, there has been a dramatic increase in cyber intrusions on Ukraine government and civilian networks from Russia.
Signal: Diplomatic ultimatums. The list of demands that Russia issued last week was a non-starter for the US and NATO allies. It is simply not a serious proposal for the start of the negotiations.
Signal: The information battlefield is now being prepared for a provocation that can be pinned on Ukraine, US or NATO (or all 3). They will be used as part of an excuse to justify an invasion.
There’s a lot more signals and reasons in the thread. Of course, there’s a similar situation with Taiwan, and China might be looking to see how the US reacts in Ukraine to inform its risk management.
It feels like the US is kind of sleepwalking through this period. Admiral Davidson sparked a lot of controversy when he said China would invade Taiwan in six years. That scare tactic may have helped boost DoD’s budget by $25 billion, but most of that was procurement pork anyway so I don’t think it had much to do with Russia/China threats.
The Pacific Deterrence Initiative, for example, requested mostly ships and aircraft rather than weapons, missile defense, and logistics as INDOPACOM’s assessment showed. By the time these ships and aircraft are contracted out and rolled off the line, it could be too late.
To a lot of people I talk with, it seems that the US won’t get serious about accelerating acquisition until an invasion of Ukraine or Taiwan actually happens. Then it will be a crash course in “whatever it takes.” Unfortunately, the US might not have the muscles it used to have back in the 1940s and 50s to execute.
It’s not just about maximizing ships, aircraft, missiles in the force structure, but how fast electronic warfare signatures can be identified and adapted, how well cyber teams can infiltrate enemy systems, and how quickly counter UAS systems can be fielded.
The ability to innovate on rapid timelines will be critical. But this is virtually impossible with today’s centralized, long-lead times structures. The longer DoD waits to reform its acquisition process, the more confusion and inefficiency will reign when a crisis emerges. Luckily, the PPBE Reform commission is getting underway in January 2022, but like building a Navy ship, these efforts will take years to coalesce into something tangible.
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