The U.S. Navy now faces contradictory demands. On the one hand, Congress and others are telling it to heed the lessons of recent catastrophes and take a more incremental approach to ship and technology design, procurement, and testing. Yet it also faces congressional pressure to get a significantly larger battle force—in a hurry. That may explain the cognitive dissonance that continues to define naval planning.
That was from Alex Wooley: Float, Move and Fight. Another aspect of that cognitive dissonance is Congress wanting to rapidly incorporate unmanned vessels to the fleet, while at the same time slashing relevant R&D budgets, forcing land-based tests of subsystems as if it were the DDG-1000 Zumwalt, and adding layers of bureaucracy.
My general view of the Navy shipbuilding debate is that everyone wants to do better, but all the 30-year planning puts risk avoidance at the top of mind. Success is measured by execution to a plan. Realistic plans are based on historical data. The past several ship programs were problematic. Problematic developments and cost growth must therefore be built into future estimates. These realistic future estimates are flat at best without larger budgets.
And so the pessimists win the day. They remind us of fact-of-life tradeoffs. Their vision 30 years into the future is a fleet that looks virtually identical to today’s fleet — with incremental upgrades like Columbia replacing the Ohio-class, SSN(X) replacing the Virginia-class, and the Large Surface Combatant replacing the DDG-51s, as well as a few experimental unmanned systems thrown in.
I think this pessimist view is self-fulfilling unless actions are taken to “bend the curve.” There is no fact-of-life tradeoff in shipbuilding over the next 30 years. Commercial industries have the ability to reinvent themselves through new entrants and competition, simultaneously driving down costs and increasing capabilities. This is certainly true in shipbuilding with new designs made possible by advances in AI/ML, communications, sensors, manufacturing, and so forth.
The question is whether the Navy can do business differently to allow these possibilities to pay off. The Navy has lost the good faith of oversight in this regard, and must build it back up. That requires a strong narrative of how it will bend the cost curve as well as detailed information on its current set of programs, the progress being made, and how those actions validate the narrative.
While there’s a lot to be said on the acquisition front that can enable the improved outcomes, a good one that is not often heard from the punditry is bolstering in-house development. Here’s more from Wooley’s article:
… U.S. problems stem in part from the way the Navy designs ships. Post-Cold War cuts led to a slowdown in new shipbuilding across the board, and as a result, ailing private industry lobbied the Clinton administration to take on more engineering and design work, a function historically performed in-house by the Navy. Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) and its associated labs had earlier designed successful ships like the Ticonderoga-class cruisers and the Wasp-class amphibious assault ships. Then, seeking cost savings in the late 1990s, the Navy reduced this in-house naval architecture and engineering staff by 75 percent, from roughly 1,200 to 300.
… What can be done? Some think Washington should throw more money at the problem by, for example, increasing the Navy’s budget—moving away from the traditional “rule of thirds” division of budget resources among the Army, Air Force, and Navy. Another fix would be to rebuild NAVSEA’s in-house engineering and design capabilities. At the very least, critical subsystems need to be successfully prototyped before being integrated into a ship’s design. And there should be more discipline before formally launching a new shipbuilding program, ensuring that every new technology has been rigorously assessed.
But just as a slow-moving aircraft carrier generates tremendous forward momentum, the U.S. planning and budgetary process becomes hard to steer or stop once it gets going, especially when funds are already flowing to a new ship class… A straightforward fix—though difficult with annual budget assessments—would be to ensure accurate, long-term shipbuilding plans. Such plans would allow industry to make investments, hire and train workers, and build capacity.
Leave a Reply