Pierre Sprey testifies before Congress in a 1971 hearing “Weapon Systems Acquisition Process.”
… if we cannot afford to execute a program under competitive prototype conditions, then I would conclude that that is probably an indication that we are not ready for that program, that we have not developed enough of the components to be sure that the program will be a success.
I think there’s some wisdom there. A causal observation would be that such an approach would slow down DoD’s ability to develop new systems. The often heard line is, “we’re never going to compete an aircraft carrier.” And it’s not like Rickover performed competitive prototypes of the first nuclear aircraft carrier back in the late 1950s.
If we pull that back a little more, the carrier hull was not the major technical challenge but integrating eight nuclear reactors (by the way, every carrier other than the Enterprise had two reactors). So in a way the propulsion subsystem was the real challenge, already derisked with successful integration on the Nautilus submarine where Rickover literally called up the president of Electric Boat and asked him if he wanted the job.
The Nautilus, in turn, was derisked by investigations into water-cooled and sodium-cooled reactors, but ultimately only the one water-cooled reactor was prototyped in Idaho, and as was Rickover’s mantra, “Mk-1 equals Mk-2.” In other words, the prototype reactor would also be the reactor integrated into the Nautilus.
This provides some evidence against Sprey’s advice, only to embark on a program with competitive prototypes based on matured components. But I could easily have also pointed to ballistic missiles which had competitive developments across the services.
Indeed, looking at the new CVN-78 Ford class carrier, even if there was no competitive prototype, it would have been far better had the Navy fully matured technologies like EMALS, AAG, and the weapons elevator.
I think ultimately that the best interpretation of Sprey’s recommendation: Rather than funding subsystems primarily as an integrated package with the total system, DoD should have independent families of developments for classes of components and subsystems which can be modified for platform integration if needed. This creates a type of enterprise capability, rather than having components created specifically under major system programs.
To some degree this component growth is already done by program executive offices like PEO Integrated Warfare Systems in the Navy among others. In essence, Rickover’s naval reactors group matured the propulsion for the bureau of ships to integrate onto a hull. There was no single program manager with full cognizance of the program. Where there was such unity of command in the Polaris and Atlas missile systems, both program used competitive development for all major subsystems.
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