When we’re looking at regulating how we do these contracts with the programs of record, it’s too much in a box. There isn’t enough freedom for our program managers to make innovative decisions about what they want and what they need to achieve our goals. Ideally, in national security we set the objective — this is what we want to be able to do — and then we create a maximum amount of flexibility in terms of how you achieve that objective. That is not the way we do it in the Pentagon. For the most part there are all kinds of boxes that you’ve got to check, all the way up to here, and as long as you check all those boxes you’re fine even if at the end of the day you don’t solve the problem.
… That’s the type of innovation that we need within the Pentagon. Not to be locked into all of these tight little boxes where we can’t be creative. Technology, innovation, the rapid pace of change is what’s going to get us to the point where we have strong national security. We have the technology, we have the people who are able to do this. We got to take the straight jacket off let that creativity go forward so we can solve problems in a cost effective way.
That was HASC chairman Adam Smith at a recent event, The Future of Defense Spending. I wonder what leadership in the Pentagon think about his statements. I imagine that a lot of the perceived inflexibility in defense management is due to oversight requirements — particularly from Congress. Programs require this laundry list of box checking in order for Congress to believe there’s rigor behind it and allow funds to be turned on.
Now, Adam Smith doesn’t speak for Congress. He has a fair amount of influence. And so does his counterpart in the SASC Jack Reed, who I believe would agree with the general thrust of Smith’s comments. It would be easy to blame appropriators, but the NDAA passed by the Armed Services Committees included 1,480 pages — by far the longest NDAA in its 60 year history — and includes onerous paper analyses like more sustainment planning ahead of development approval. These mandates coming from Congress are what the “frozen middle” uses to hammer down any manager who tries to do things creatively.
I’ll be interested to hear what actions Congress can take to unleash a more commercial style of product management in DoD. I’ll also be interested to hear what USD(A&S) nominee Michael Brown can do on his own. The Adaptive Acquisition Framework has some goodness, but it’s success comes down to the culture of implementation. If Michael Brown wasn’t the A&S nominee, I’d be more bearish on the AAF.
At any rate, greater “freedom” for program managers means nothing so long as you have multi-year planning for Acquisition Program Baselines. If managers can amend these plans in real time — exert their creativity and think outside the box — then the APB becomes meaningless. For people who grew up with industrial era processes, the idea that APBs are irrelevant would make their heads explode. It will take time for commercial practices that balance flexibility and rigor to seep into the consciousness of defense leadership.
Here’s more from Smith on the incentive structure:
Now, I’ve never worked at the Pentagon. I’ve worked with them for a lot of years. But my strong sense is that you are not rewarded and promoted for going outside the box. Okay, you checked the boxes, you did everything right and at the end of two years regardless of how the program’s doing you move up. If you come in and say, ‘look this is all BS, we’re gonna do something that nobody’s ever done before,’ yeah right. That is not what you get promoted. Therefore people don’t do that… we need to encourage that type of creativity to get to the better solutions.
Enjoyed article. Only a huge culture change can melt the Frozen Middle