Podcast: PPBE Reform Panel 2 — From Ideas to Implementation

In this second discussion on the future of the Planning-Programming-Budgeting-Execution (PPBE) process, Center for Government Contracting executive director Jerry McGinn hosts a distinguished panel including:

  • Jamie Morin — VP at the Aerospace Corp and former Director of CAPE
  • Dov Zakheim — Senior Fellow at CNA and former USD Comptroller
  • John Young — Principal at JY Strategies LLC and former USD AT&L

Watch the video here, and listen to it on the Acquisition Talk podcast. It is difficult to boil the conversation down because each of the three panelists had unique views. However, one theme that all seemed to agree on was the importance of flexibility to make program tradeoffs, and that such a construct requires trust between DoD and Congressional personnel. Here’s Dov Zakheim:

And I would argue very strongly that if the department is really serious about getting past with Kath Hicks, the deputy’s called the valley of death — the time it takes between the time you actually come up with some idea and actually field it, you’ve got to be able to move money around quickly. It’s as simple as that.

And as for getting there, “It is a matter of trust… Rule number one for the Pentagon is don’t try to bluff your way past Congress. Hey, they’re going to catch you and B they’re going to really beat you up, not just this year, but future years.” I think those comments provide some broad points of commonality.

Differing Perspectives

In my view, there are two major approaches to budget and program flexibility. This first is represented by John Young, which finds that the only major changes necessary are to increase reprogramming and new start authorities. I see this as the traditional view which agrees with the status quo of multi-year justification and locking down program baselines, but concedes the fact that DoD needs some authority to move those funds around in year of execution. That achieves some “portfolio” management capabilities. Here’s John Young:

If you could build program lanes for major programs and then have some reasonable reprogramming authorities, you’d be able to fix things and treat it somewhat like a portfolio. And then there may be other places where you need a portfolio where there’s like truly cross cutting technology. But many of the platforms demand a discipline program and a budget to go forward.

 

… And we need to see if we can get some ground with a Congress on new starts… [and] the Pentagon needs to educate the Hill better on the impact of continuing resolutions. They are just devastating

Jamie Morin responded with this on-point observation:

… if you think across the points that both Dov and John had been making and get back to the reports we’ve heard about, the conversation surrounding reprogramming and transfer authorities and the conversation about program element structure are really two different sides of the same coin because you don’t need your transfer authorities and your reprogramming process if you have flexibility within unappropriated program element. The basis for constructing those program elements is not written in the constitution and it’s not a matter of immutable, natural law. It’s a choice.

That’s the right way to frame this basic aspect of the discussion. But consolidating program elements into portfolios basically a substitute for reprogramming and new start authorities. The continuing resolutions problem is also minimized with portfolio elements since DoD has greater flexibility to make tradeoffs and new starts while Congress hammers out the authorizations and appropriations.

Portfolio elements are not merely a substitute for many of these prior approval issues. Portfolio elements provides a completely different paradigm for defense management.

Consider this. If you increase reprogramming authority, then you’re abandoning the logical rationale for the PPBE — which revolves around the continuing stability and relevance of program baselines over years or decades. Why else would McNamara have oriented the budget around specific weapons programs if he didn’t believe that analysts could pretty well predict the course of technology, user preferences, and enemy threats?

This is pretty obviously blown out of the water for anything requiring dual-use technology, because if analysts could predict the course of commercial capabilities then they should be a Silicon Valley VC partner or a Wall Street hedge fund manager. Program choice cannot be clearly distinguished from the process by which those programs are brought to fruition.

Bake Flexibility into the System

Here’s a nice story from Dov Zakheim:

Let me just finish with one other story in November of 2001. So this is what six weeks after 9/11. And we’re already going into Afghanistan. Ron Sega, who was then the head of DDR and E the defense research and engineering shop comes to me and says, I’ve got a weapon that can blow these terrorists out of their caves.

 

It’s called a hyperbaric weapon. I said, so what’s the problem. He says nobody’s ever wanted to fund it. I said, how much do you need? You said, I don’t know, less than 50 million. And when can you get it out there? He says, you get me the 50 million — or whatever it was — I’ll have it out in the field by March.

 

Okay. This is November.  I had, everybody’s got a Bishop’s fund, which is a whole other thing. Everybody’s got a 10% will withhold at every level, which is money that gets sloshed around. And that’s a whole problem in and of itself. But I wasn’t the Bishop. I was the Cardinal, Young used to kiss my ring — see, he admits it — and so did members of Congress, by the way, when they wanted the money.

 

So I said to him, I’ve got the money. You get the money. Four months later, that weapon was blowing terrorists out of caves. My point is that is what flexibility is all about. And it shouldn’t be managed through Bishop’s funds. It should be baked into the system and I’ll stop there.

There’s a lot to that story. One reason these $50 million-or-so efforts fall under the cracks is that they are not big enough to justify the major muscle movements to get a program started. But the real point here is that the PPBE, by aligning programs with budgets, was intended to raise the Comptroller to the righthand of the SecDef (this was before the days of the DepSecDef). The Office of Systems Analysis, now CAPE, was first couched under the Comptroller until a spat between Robert Anthony and Alain Enthoven (another long story).

But the involvement of Comptroller in program decisions which have major operational impacts, and its position vis-a-vis the Joint Chiefs and other organizations, has been a long standing question. Admiral Rickover, as usual, was a person with a strong view on this subject: “The Comptroller’s function,” Rickover said in a 1971 hearing, “should be to advise the Secretary of Defense as to the availability of funds, not whether a specific weapon system is or is not needed.”

Obviously, a budget made of portfolio elements reduces the Comptroller’s ability to decide on resourcing for specific weapon systems. That doesn’t mean there is no financial control, it just means financial control isn’t shared far and wide with Comptroller as one of the top gate keepers.

Question of Tenure

Whatever happened to the Bernard Schrievers, Red Raborns, and Hyman Rickovers? These program managers had extensive experience and domain expertise, allowing them to drive complex programs to success. They did not perform a 2-4 year stint and move onto the next assignment as is the norm today. Here’s John Young:

When I was there, they [Hill staffers] had a deep and long tenure. Some of that tenure has come down, but still generally they have a visibility across the budget and experience with the four year or less rotation of PEOs and PMs, they sometimes have more continuity than the department does on the program.

While that is true, the poor incentives place on program managers is not a fact of life, and indeed it is largely a consequence of the PPBE which has drawn out timelines into decades such that no individual can be held accountable. Detailed program planning is there so that rotational folks can manage it without making big choices, much like the FAR is there so you don’t need lawyers to write contract agreements. The incentives and culture of the workforce are intimately tied up with the structure of decision making.

More to the point, when congressional members and staff gets involved in program decision making, they becomes accountable for the results. Because policies are so focused on the budgets of each individual program, they are making decisions about what the workforce will do.

Conclusion

I’ve cherry picked a few comments here to dive into, but there’s a ton more. Listen to the whole discussion. I’ll leave you with some words of wisdom from Jamie Morin:

The speakers this morning talked about mission portfolios. They talked about organizational portfolios. They talked about operational challenge portfolios. I think you could frankly try in different areas all of those models. It’s not a question of, again, restructuring the entire future year’s defense plan into one big bang transformation for the department. It’s about working through some different ways that could work, letting talented leaders build trust with the Congress and with the secretary, and having this plug into a department level governance process.

Full-Text Transcripts

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