Section 802 of the FY 2021 NDAA is called “Improving planning, execution, and oversight of life cycle sustainment activities,” but really it has dramatic effect on RDT&E and procurement of major systems.
The FY 2021 NDAA requires more detailed sustainment plans of “covered systems.”
- Covered systems include all Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAP) where RDT&E is greater than $300M in 1990 dollars ($535M in FY21) or Procurement greater than $1.9B ($3.4B in FY21).
- Covered systems include all Middle Tier of Acquisition (MTA) programs that breach the same cost thresholds as MDAPs.
The table below shows the requirements of the new sustainment plan on the left, and compares that to the existing responsibilities for product support managers on the right.
| Life-cycle management and product support (Title 10 §2337) | |
| Life Cycle Sustainment Plan | Product Support Manager |
| MDAPs and MTA (Title 10 §2340) | Major Weapon Systems (Title 10 §2302d) |
| RDT&E > $300M (FY90); or | RDT&E > $115M (FY90); or |
| Procurement > $1.8B (FY90) | Procurement > $540M (FY90) |
| Plan Requirements | Responsibilities |
| 1. a comprehensive product support strategy | 1. develop and implement a comprehensive product support strategy for the weapon system |
| 2. performance goals, including key performance parameters for sustainment, key system attributes of the covered system, and other appropriate metrics | 2. use appropriate predictive analysis and modeling tools that can improve material availability and reliability, increase operational availability rates, and reduce operation and sustainment costs |
| 3. an approved life-cycle cost estimate for the covered system | 3. conduct appropriate cost analyses to validate the product support strategy, including cost-benefit analyses as outlined in Office of Management and Budget Circular A–94 |
| 4. affordability constraints and key cost factors that could affect the operating and support costs of the covered system | 4. ensure achievement of desired product support outcomes through development and implementation of appropriate product support arrangements |
| 5. sustainment risks and proposed mitigation plans for such risks | 5. adjust performance requirements and resource allocations across product support integrators and product support providers as necessary to optimize implementation of the product support strategy |
| 6. engineering and design considerations that support cost-effective sustainment of the covered system | 6. periodically review product support arrangements between the product support integrators and product support providers to ensure the arrangements are consistent with the overall product support strategy |
| 7. a technical data and intellectual property management plan for product support | 7. prior to each change in the product support strategy or every five years, whichever occurs first, revalidate any business-case analysis performed in support of the product support strategy |
| 8. major maintenance and overhaul requirements that will be required during the life cycle of the covered system | 8. ensure that the product support strategy maximizes small business participation at the appropriate tiers |
| 9. ensure that product support arrangements for the weapon system describe how such arrangements will ensure efficient procurement, management, and allocation of Government-owned parts inventories in order to prevent unnecessary procurements of such parts. | |
Like the product support strategy requires updating every 5 years, so does the new sustainment plan require recurring reviews every 5 years.
At the end of every fiscal year, the Secretary of each military department must submit their sustainment reviews to congress, including mitigation plans for programs with significant sustainment cost growth, defined as:
- At least 25% growth to most recent independent cost estimate; or
- At least 50% growth to the original baseline estimate.
These new processes and thresholds seem to expand the kinds of control we see on the acquisition side with the Nunn-McCurdy Act over into sustainment as well.
Why does all this affect weapons development? Because the life cycle sustainment plan must be approve PRIOR to Milestone B for Major Capabilities or entry into Middle Tier of Acquisition. In some ways, elements of the sustainment plan are already in the acquisition plan, but these added measures can only slow down what is already a tediously long timeline to get programs started.
My biggest worry is that excessive sustainment planning ahead of experimentation will lead to the familiar “too many cooks in the kitchen” problem and actually corrupt simple, elegant, reliable, and maintainable designs. In the early stages, DoD should be MINIMIZING transaction costs to starting new programs, allowing for pivoting direction if needed, and cancelling programs before they suck up too much money. Through competitive down-select, sustainment should be as important an evaluation factor as performance. Then, detailed sustainment planning makes more sense ahead of a Milestone C production run when more information is known to perform those analyses.
I’ll refer you to my concerns from last year when I learned about the draft version of this bill. But let’s do a thought experiment with a more agile approach to Middle Tier (MTA). Let’s say one service has a $200M prototype MTA to prove out some new subsystems. It’s then ready for a $400M prototype MTA program for integration into a platform. And then it goes into a $2B rapid fielding MTA program. And then, due to high demand, it goes through a block upgrade and another MTA fielding program of a new increment.
This program will clearly breach the cost threshold for a life cycle sustainment plan, but since decisions were modularized, no single effort broke the threshold. Is that allowed? Or does that conflict with Appropriations Act language requiring full funding and independent life cycle cost estimates, even for MTAs?
DoD already levies a regulatory requirement to develop Life Cycle Sustainment Plans (LCSPs) – beginning at Milestone A. Non-directive guidance has evolved over time that already drives the content in Sec 802 into the plans – so nothing new there. Alas, I must give a hearty laugh to the notion that “Through competitive down-select, sustainment should be as important an evaluation factor as performance” – if only it were so . . .
The changes Sec 802 makes to the sustainment reviews required under 10 USC 2441 are mildly troubling, but they seem unlikely to do much. The breach thresholds are indeed like “Nunn-McCurdy for sustainment” – only without the teeth. I’ll find out for sure in a few months, but I’m fully expecting all the older platforms to be in breach — only because the cost estimators who did the estimates weren’t omniscient! Unlike a program being acquired, the consequence of a breach in sustainment is unclear – and may not even indicate a problem with the sustainment strategy (maybe we’re flying it more, maybe fuel cost varied more, maybe we’ve done more mods, maybe we’re using it differently, etc.).
How can you effectively frame guidelines and implement a “Nunn-McCurdy for sustainment” for programs that were fielded in the 60s, 70’s, and 80s that are now far beyong their planned life expectancy? DMSMS and obsolescence are driving sustainment costs far beyond the originally stated economical repair costs, yet MAJCOMs still require the weapons system to support the JCS OPLANs. Words are not matching reality, if they did, sustainment funding would not be getting cuts a significantly as it currently is, yet we, SPOs, are being held accountable for systems not being available to the warfighter.