Because of the uncertainties and perceived criticality of ICBMs, the WDD and Ramo-Wooldridge believed it unwise to rely on only one approach. If it did not work, then the entire Atlas program would be in vain. Consequently, the WDD developed separate technical solutions for the Atlas in parallel, so as to have an alternative if any one of them failed. It also developed an entirely separate missile system, the Titan. Although costly, this “concurrent” development drove system design testing forward at a rapid pace while reducing technical risks. It continued this policy for the construction of launch sites and training for operations. Searching for a way to explain this parallel development, Schriever coined the term “concurrency” to describe his management strategy and process.
That was Stephen Johnson, “From Concurrency to Phased Planning: An Episode in the History of Systems Management.” I don’t think most people consider the term “concurrency” in that way. What Schriever was talking about better corresponds to “parallel development” or maybe “leader/follower.”
Here’s another definition from David Hounshell’s excellent, “The Medium is the Message, or How Context Matters”:
By 1953, these reorganizations had resulted in a more tightly controlled and centralized organization known as the Air Force Research and Development Command (ARDC), which had been formally established in 1950. Among the air force, officers who played roles in the establishment of ARDC, one would come to symbolize many of the ideals espoused by advocates of systems analysis – Bernard A. Schriever. Some of Alchian’s first musings about the importance of separating R&D decisions from procurement decisions were directed at the principles Schriever (then a colonel) advocated in his role as a planning officer for strategic bomber development. Schriever became an increasingly effective and powerful advocate for an approach to weapons development that eventually bore the name “concurrent engineering” or, more simply, “concurrency.” Stated in its purist form, the fundamental idea of concurrent engineering is that a final product (such as a bomber or a missile) can be so well specified in terms of its performance that all aspects of its engineering, design, and production can be pursued essentially in parallel rather than in series.
That’s the kind of concurrency we usually talk about: concurrent development and production. By the way, Hounshell finds that Schriever did not propose parallel development with the Titan as a second program to follow the Atlas ICBM. Indeed, it was Frank Collbohm, president of RAND at the time, who — taking a page from Armen Alchian’s book — recommended a second program to hedge bets.
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