Business models for developing technologies for a profit are end-to-end solutions that cannot be adopted by the Army acquisition enterprise for several reasons, not the least of which is a lack of competition. Every successful business model relies on market forces and competition to drive innovation, efficiency, and productivity. Consumer choices in a competitive marketplace provide companies with evidence for business decisions. The Army cannot adopt models based on a competitive marketplace because the Army is prohibited by law from competing with industry. Consequently, the Army requires a model for technology development that is not designed with the end goal of making a profit and does not rely on competition to make evidence-based decisions about requirements.
That was a nice article from Lt Col Bull Holland, “How the Army Ought to Write Requirements.” I wasn’t aware of the 1997 NDAA provision that prohibited the Army from competing with industry. Not sure which section, but that’s what was cited. Where was that for the OMFV debate?
The Army doesn’t need to compete with organic designs to create something more like market competition. Rather than these once-in-a-generation programs, there needs to be continuous experimentation of alternative designs with optionality built into the system for fielding the most promising. That is prohibited not by the 1997 NDAA, but by the budgeting process which was designed to select only the single-best paper design.
It should be no surprise that the “requirements” process started in the Air Force in the early 1950s along with their systems analysis approach, which ultimately cannot be separated from their adoption of the performance budget from the very start of the Air Force. All these concepts are interrelated from the very start. Luckily, the Air Force remained very opportunistic through the 1950s and didn’t adhere to that system in many respects.
Lt Col Holland sees the requirements process as the root of evil:
… The need for changes to prevent further failures in the Army acquisition enterprise is undeniable. The system in this enterprise most in need of change is the requirements process governed by JCIDS. The core problem with how the Army implements JCIDS is the lack of a process and culture that values hypothesis testing and evidence over positional power and experience. The value of an evidence-based requirements process is demonstrated by multiple authors and entrepreneurs.
I basically agree that the DoD should be built on evidence-based requirements. It is not only the 1997 NDAA that blocks this. In a market environment the customers that use my service pay for it. The more effective the service relative to any alternatives the more I get paid. DoD goes into combat infrequently and entities that are serviced by combat arms do not pay for this priviledge. Congress is the main customer and their major interest is to have Weapon System or AIS work happen in member districts. It is hard to to get competitive feedback in this non-market situation. The military should more carefully study combat after-action reports, look at it exercises in more detail, use more simulations, and constantly develop/improve tests during the development/manufacturing proesses.
Agree!
Which provisions in the 1997 NDAA are relevant in this connection? I’m unfamiliar with it.
Exactly! I tried to track that down and linked to the 97 NDAA in the post, but I couldn’t find whatever section he was referring to using word searches or running through the contents. If you discover the reference the author gave, or if it was correct, please share!