Central planning did not work any better in the Pentagon than it did in the Soviet bloc. Not that we were not warned. The problem of program budgeting’s disconnect from reality was pointed out in 1954 by the public administration scholar Frederick Mosher, and its Achilles Heal was time. The process time it takes to conduct program budgeting requires perfect foreknowledge of events many years prior to budget execution. Perfect knowledge as we know it does not exist, except in the minds of central planners. A budget system disconnected from the importance of time and impervious to flexibility leads to waste, misallocation of resources, and missed opportunities for innovation that can never be recaptured.
… It couldn’t be a moment too soon as future DOD programs are now approaching an eight-year morass to move through the requirements, planning, and program budgeting processes to go from good idea to first obligation of funds in the form of a signed contract. China delivers tangible capability to its forces in five-seven years while we are still moving paper. It doesn’t take a rocket scientist to figure out who is going to win that kind of competition.
That was from the excellent Bill Greenwalt, “Yes, America’s military budget process is terrible.” I’ll put in a little plug for myself through Bill’s words:
Anyone interested in the future of defense innovation should read Eric Lofgren’s provocative white paper presented at the panel, and they should also read the referenced historical documents and reports from the 1950s and 1960s that outline the basic assumptions and premises that underscore the adoption of program budgeting at DOD.
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