The length of time between the start of budget planning and execution strains any organization’s predictive capabilities. The process effectively asks the individuals and organization writing the budget estimates to predict the level and areas of resources that are going to be needed years into the future. It is not hard to imagine that any estimate made two or three years ago will need to be adjusted as it is executed.
That was from an excellent paper by Fred Bartels, “Cumbersome Defense Reprogramming Process Hampers National Defense and Should Be Streamlined.” Reprogramming actions allow the DoD to move funds in the year of execution. Of course, the more you let the DoD reprogram, the less meaningful is the budget. Reprogramming means execution not to plan. So increasing reprogramming flexibility should make you wonder: why do we program the budget at all if we don’t intend to stick to the program plan?
Here’s Fred on the difficulty of reprogramming:
One congressionally mandated panel found that for a typical reprogramming request at least 12 different offices were required to approve the request before it ever gets to Congress for actual approval:
- Program manager,
- Military Service comptroller appropriation manager,
- Military Service budget manager,
- Military Service budget director,
- Military Service comptroller,
- Military Service vice chief of staff,
- Military Service secretary,
- DOD Directorate for Freedom of Information and Security Review,
- DOD Comptroller budget directorates,
- DOD Comptroller,
- Deputy Secretary of Defense, and
- Office of Management and Budget
That’s a lot of layers of approval. No wonder there is so little prior approval reprogramming in the DoD. Only 30 or so prior approval reprogrammings get passed each year, amounting to a few billion. Compare that to reprogrammings in 1970, totaling 722 actions and $4.9 billion (more than $26 billion in constant FY2020 dollars). Fred has a nice quote from Fisher where I got that 1970 stat:
Congressional control over defense reprogramming has progressed through a number of stages. At first the Appropriations Committees required the Defense Department to keep them advised of major reprogrammings; later the Department had to submit semiannual reports; finally the Pentagon was required to obtain prior approval from the Appropriations Committees before implementing certain kinds of reprogramming actions.
I tend to think that increasing reprogrammings simply demonstrates the non-viability of program planning from 2 to 5 years out. The DoD should skip over band-aids and move toward portfolio budget accounts. I think Fred is a little more conservative, looking to increase flexibility within the current paradigm. Here are snippets from his conclusion:
Any changes in how reprogramming and transfers work will require the executive and legislative branches to work closely together to establish a system built on mutual trust. As such, the executive and legislative branches should:
- Establish a fast-track for low-risk reprogramming requests.
- Congress and the DOD should define the common characteristics among the requests that are approved without any modifications, and highlight those characteristics in any request.
The Department of Defense should:
- Provide more detailed justifications and move beyond static data.
- Accelerate the process in the executive branch.
Congress should:
- Raise the transfer authority level proposed by the House in the 2021 defense appropriations bill.
- Test different reprogramming thresholds.
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