Overall, DoDD 5000.01 went from 10 pages to 16, though two of those are for a table of contents. In terms of word count, it rose from roughly 3,200 words to 4,000 words (25% increase). Compare that to the private sector’s Scrum Guide 2020, which will be reduced by three pages to 13 relative to its predecessor. You can read the September 9, 2020 version here, and the August 31, 2018 version here.
Reading through the two documents, it doesn’t appear that all too much has changed. There are some nice words about “innovation” and “responsiveness,” but those were mostly in the previous version. The same with “tailoring” the program reporting requirements. It would seem a lot of the Directive isn’t really a directive at all, but a wish list of cultural aspects.
Here are a bunch of good insights from Michelle Johnson at NPS. Two things that stuck out to me:
(1) From Total System Approach to System of Systems.
The previous 5000.01 had a section of “Total Systems Approach,” making the program manager the single point of responsibility reporting to the Milestone Decision Authority. It’s as if the PM’s program is some siloed thing from all other programs, and the PM has complete authority and ownership of technical, cost, and lifecycle aspects. This kind of structuring of defense policy is precisely what led to defense programs being overly “stovepiped” and unable to operate together.
The rewrite removes the “Total System Approach” and replaces it with a “System of Systems Analysis.” It’s not really clear what this means in practice. There’s already an Analysis of Alternatives performed up-front. These AoAs are supposed to consider systems in as broad a context as necessary (although, for many reasons they end up doing incremental changes to legacy systems).
Perhaps all the System of Systems Analysis is meant for is to make sure new starts adhere to some modular open system architecture. It sounds like DoD intends it to be more more than that in some vague way. There’s a nice buzz word “kill-chain” in there, and “capability portfolio management.” But will it be another hurdle to starting any kind of effort outside of S&T?
(2) Increase in participants with equity.
The previous 5000.01 identified the responsibilities of USD(AT&L), DOT&E, and the CIO over the acquisition system. Then there was the Chairman of the JCS, who validated requirements. Four primary organizations.
In the rewrite, there were more than double. Of course, USD(AT&L) split up into USD(A&S) and USD(R&E). The former has primary responsibility for acquisition, but interacts with numerous other stakeholders, including: USD(I&S), USD (P&R), the CMO, the CIO, DOT&E, DCAPE, and the DoD Component Heads. Some component heads report to aforementioned positions, such as Missile Defense Agency and the Defense Logistics Agency. Others do not, such as the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Special Operations Command.
While the rewrite, which includes the equities of numerous officials throughout the Department of Defense, probably better represents what actually happens than the previous 5000.01 directive. I think the DoD was backed into such enumeration because of how they wrote 5000.83 for Middle Tier of Acquisition, where several participants had decision rights. Though it reflects reality, it may not necessarily point to real change in terms of actually being streamlined and agile.
Conclusion.
I don’t think there’s much to conclude from the new DoDD 5000.01. A lot of it is fluff. It will all come down to implementation and whether the culture can change. More important will be to watch what’s happening with the DoD Instructions — the Adaptive Acquisition Framework. My impression there is that all the functionals will remain involved, meaning lots of paperwork, analysis, and approvals eating up years of lead time.
Last note: it’s interesting that the new directive doesn’t have a section defining the Program Manager anywhere, or the chain of command. It is kind of implicit throughout.
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