The Albacore lessons tell us exactly how to develop new technology: theorize, research, test, develop, refine, test some more and when you have a solid concept, design and build a prototype – a single prototype, not an entire class based on unproven technology. Albacore proved the validity of this approach. Unbelievably to us, today, Albacore went from a theory in 1949 to a commissioned prototype in 1953 – just 4 years. Today, it takes us 4 years just to line up all the component manufacturers in all 50 states that will supply parts for a new program!
Lest you think this was some kind of fluke occurrence, the Navy went from WWII style submarines in 1952 to true, modern, nuclear powered, attack submarines in 1959… Today, we’d take all those improvements and force them into a single new design which would be three decades overdue and cost a bajillion dollars. In contrast, the Navy wisely broke the developments up into small chunks and built single prototypes or small runs to evaluate the improvements and then fed the lessons learned back into the development and production cycles.
That was a good post from ComNavOps, “USS Albacore and Submarine Development.” He lists 10 separate submarine prototypes commissioned between 1951 and 1960. That’s incredible. The first Virginia-class submarine was commissioned in 2004, and the first Columbia-class won’t reach that mark until 20 or more years later.
ComNavOps recognizes that one major factor slowing down prototyping — and really the transformation of the force structure — is the total lifecycle planning approach which bogs decisions down. Paralysis by analysis, as they say. These analysts demand long production runs of multi-mission systems as a way to drive down cost. All the funding is lined up ahead of development, with program of record commitments to production and O&M. The Navy is committing to 12 Columbia-class submarines, with production stretching out into the 2040s.
When any decision is expected to result in bulk-buys at scale, the future becomes locked in and forces a great deal of weight on the early decisions. It kills off competition because there won’t be room for it, not understanding that competition is a process of discovering the most effective solutions and driving down prices, which is ultimately indeterminate. Defense officials must keep their options open, and not view a prototype as a commitment to full-rate production.
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