… we must reframe platform-centric debates to focus instead on capabilities to execute the mission relative to our adversaries. Programs that once held promise, but are no longer affordable or will not deliver needed capabilities on competition-relevant timelines, must be divested or terminated. Cost, schedule, and performance metrics alone are no longer sufficient metrics of acquisition success. We must be able to account for the interactive nature of competition and continuously assess ourselves relative to our adversaries’ adaptations…
To be successful, the U.S. Air Force must continue its future design work and accelerate the evolution and application of its operational concepts and force structure to optimize its contribution to Joint All Domain Operations. Likely future budget pressures will require the most difficult force structure decisions in generations. We cannot shy away from these decisions.
That was from the Air Force’s new Chief of Staff General Charles Brown, “Accelerate Change or Lose.” HT: Matt M.
The question is whether this is more cheap talk or if it points to real change. But what is the Air Force willing to do? It can’t just be retire the A-10. It’ll need something 10x or 100x that in order to transform the force structure. Even if the Air Force is willing to make tough choices, will OSD let it? Would OMB? Would Congress members, who sees jobs in their districts working legacy programs, but faces the unknown in terms of where those jobs will land with a big shakeup? Existing jobs are visible and vote. Uncertain future jobs just don’t matter, even if that’s what will create transformation.
Here’s a bit more from General Brown on breaking the vicious cycle:
… increasing budget pressure based on growing costs of sustainment for current an aging force structure, continuous combat operations, and long-deferred modernization.
With certain new platforms costing an arm and a leg in sustainment, continuing execution to approved APBs will just spiral us into a worse position. In other words, if we take CSAF Brown at his word, we should expect numerous MDAP programs to breach their baselines in terms of cost. Reduced quantities will lead to increased unit costs, particularly for PAUC because R&D costs are spread over fewer units. But that has to be viewed as OK, just like a reduced near-term force structure has to be viewed as OK in order to save the future force structure.
Consider how O&M is eating the DoD’s lunch. KC-46A CPFH is at $98K vs. $15-$30K for legacy tankers. F-35A worked hard to get down to $44K CPFH whereas the target is $25K — in BY$2012. I haven’t seen the F-35B or C model sustainment costs, but they are assuredly much larger than the A. Compare that to 4th generation fighters at about $10-$15K.
When the DoD gets new systems which have major increases in sustainment costs, it creates a vicious cycle. But the DoD has let sustainment reach its maximum. Rather than continue to draw acquisition funds to keep the readiness of existing force structure high, the DoD sacrifices readiness in order to buy more stuff that it cannot operate. While this makes some sense in terms of having extra systems that can be operated in an emergency when funds aren’t an issue, it still locks the DoD into inferior weapon systems.
USAF must accept reduced procurement and force structure in the near term in order to shift back into a virtuous cycle. Moving whole-heartedly into disaggregated and attritable systems that are software/data native completely changes the economics. It can push us into a virtuous cycle with low sustainment costs, allowing more money to move into modernization. There’s no law of nature that 70% of lifecycle costs must be in sustainment. We need to flip that, so its closer to 30% in sustainment.
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