As the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has documented, lead ships in new classes of naval vessels routinely fail to meet expectations… It was not always this way. During the 1960s and 1970s, the Navy took a methodical, knowledge-based, subsystem-focused approach to developing the Aegis Combat System and SPY-1 radar. Rear Admiral Wayne E. Meyer, known as the “Father of Aegis,” led these programs by focusing on maturing subsystems based on his philosophy of “Build a Little, Test a Little, Learn a Lot.” The Aegis Combat System and SPY radar have been incrementally upgraded ever since and continue to serve as the backbone of the Navy and multiple allied surface combatant fleets.
… To this end, we call for—and are encouraging with this year’s National Defense Authorization Act—the return to an Aegis-type development model in which critical subsystems are matured before the Navy procures the lead ship of a new class.
That was Senators Jim Inhofe and Jack Reed over at USNI News, “The Navy Needs a Course Correction: Prototyping with Purpose.” I think the Senators are on the right track, but are missing crucial aspects.
First, prototyping of subsystems should be a dedicated military program that continuously evolves a family of new and sustaining designs. It should not be an intermittent effort connected to detailed military requirements for platform end-items. Incremental prototyping doesn’t mix with teletic (long-range) planning.
Second, the reality of the situation is that if subsystems are to be programs in themselves, the DoD will require the whole hullabaloo of analysis of alternatives, acquisition strategy, cost estimate, and on and on, before they can go to the Congress to request funds, which, if all goes well, will be received 2 or more years later. That a long drawn out process — even if Middle-Tier authorities are used.
Piggy-backing on the first point, a family of subsystems should be a dedicated program, so that they can do what the Senators ask: build a little, test a little, learn a lot. You can’t do that if the effort to get started on a single prototype is greater than the effort to build a little. Those drawn out processes may be fine for a new platform integration effort, but not for subsystems prototyping, testing, and iterating.
Third — also related — when you have a proven prototype subsystem, in reality it will take several years before you can start justifying it on a platform and receive funding for it. You still have the valley of death due to the industrial era budget process. More continuous experimentation on decommissioned ships, existing ships, or otherwise is required from flexible funding mechanisms.
Moreover, there will be several subsystems to a platform, so you can’t expect them all to mature at the exact same time. Continuously prototyping a family of systems with experimentation onto platforms is necessary — not every new capability requires a new platform.
Fourth, technical in-house knowledge is super important — and the Senators recognize that:
In areas where government expertise strains to keep up with industry advances, leaders must ensure government technical experts receive adequate resources to keep pace. The standard must be for DoD to maintain a cadre of technical experts as knowledgeable as any outside expert in the application of a given technology to a DoD weapon system, particularly critical subsystems.
The point I’d like to make, however, is that this cannot simply be enough technical knowledge to “evaluate” contractor proposals or “architect” systems and integration. The reality is that the Navy couldn’t adequately do the evaluation and architecture jobs unless it gets back in the game of fully prototyping subsystems. The Navy is better at this than the other services, but still has a lost a lot compared to what it used to do in the Bureau days of the 1940s-60s. That means real dedication to Navy organizations that aren’t tied to specific ships and weapon systems.
Senators Inhofe and Reed are on the right track, but their proposals are destined to run aground unless the take it a couple steps further. The biggest element of this is budget reform, providing the services the ability to flexibly do the “build a little, test a little, learn a lot.” That’s simply impossible in today’s budget environment where every little step requires 2+ years of coordination to get it’s own budget line item. Providing major DoD organizations like the Program Executive Offices their own dedicated program element would allow them to do what the Senators ask. Increased transparency with real-time dashboard updates to Congress on where funds are going with notification of new starts is a crucial aspect of maintaining accountability.
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