Without rivalrous competition, we are gullible as to what weapon systems work

Just as our distant ancestors were too gullible (factually, if not strategically) about their sources of knowledge on the physical world around them, we today are too gullible on how much we can trust the many experts on which we rely. Oh we are quite capable of skepticism about our rivals, such as rival governments and their laws and officials. Or rival professions and their experts. Or rival suppliers within our profession. But without such rivalry, we revert to gullibility, at least regarding “our” prestigious experts who follow proper procedures.

That was from Robin Hanson, “Science 2.0” via Arnold Kling. There is little doubt that the proposition is true, and defense acquisition is a perfect example. When the Pentagon uses a competitive bid process to select the single-best weapon system for the next generation, that isn’t really rivalry because it is almost always based on brochuresmanship, or, if you’re lucky, based on non-representative prototypes. And then we become gullible to the supposed “experts” evaluating contractor proposals — there’s no rivalry in the source-selection board.

Too often there’s little real information to base decisions on relative to what is operationally relevant. Almost never are programs continuously competed through full-scale development and into production like we see in the commercial world.

Ostensibly, competition is too expensive. But it should be clear from hindsight that (1) programs often grow in cost (even if that is hidden or postponed to sustainment), meaning the DoD really could have afforded multiple programs in the first place; and (2) program baselines using “will cost” techniques are already provided far too much funding compared to what should be required in a lean/iterative/competitive environment.