Last time, I discussed the first problem in killing a carrier, that of finding it. That alone is a challenge, but the problems for the attacker aren’t over at that point.
… Now it’s time to look at how many missiles we’d need to overwhelm a carrier’s defenses. A typical group with the sort of peacetime loadouts we’d expect if we were going up against Enemyistan would have 96 Standards, 112 ESSMs, and 42 RAMs, a total of 250 missiles. Based on recent experience off of Yemen, I think it’s very conservative to assume that you’ll have a 50% kill probability against a typical missile with one of these weapons.6 Under this assumption, the CVBG can shoot down 125 incoming ASMs.7 With the loadouts you’d expect in a war with China, that number could top 200.
… But there are other defenses besides missiles. There’s also electronic warfare to consider. This is a fantastically complicated topic, and we can’t know the answer without an actual war, but I think it’s reasonable to assume that EW will draw off about 50% of missiles that get close enough to be affected.
… There are a few super/hypersonic ASMs with larger warheads around, but they’re larger and much more expensive. To a first approximation, the gains from higher speed are pretty much balanced out by the ‘virtual attrition’ of fewer missiles and the fact that they can’t fly as low as slower missiles, increasing the response time of the system. Anti-ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs) are outside the scope of this particular analysis, but I’ll deal with them next time.
That was from Naval Gazing, a great resource on all things Navy. HT: Michael.
He says, “Probably the most popular thing I’ve written is my rebuttal of the claims that the carriers are all doomed if war breaks out with China. I’ve covered finding the carriers, conventional missile attack, ballistic missiles and submarines.” Check out his bibliography.
Another style of argument is that of Edward Luttwak. People had been thinking that capital ships would be unsurvivable in the early 20th century due to torpedo boats. But capital ships are expensive because they are large, modular platforms that can be upgraded and modified to become survivable. In the back-and-forth of war, you can expect learning and modifications. And so the carrier strike group, because it is so large and expensive, has the potential for a lot of tricks up its sleeves. I think Naval Gazing is pointing to the current tricks in the toolbox, but I’d venture that many more tricks are plausible especially if we get into a shooting war.
Addendum: Of course, Naval Gazing’s logic probably makes the most sense in blue water. Carriers operating in the South China Sea might not be the best idea.
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