Here are some excerpts from an excellent sci-fi story by Arthur C. Clarke, Superiority, in which a galactic power engaged with an inferior power ultimately loses the war because it tries to leap-frog technologies rather than build upon proven designs.
The ultimate cause of our failure was a simple one: despite all statements to the contrary, it was not due to lack of bravery on the part of our men, or to any fault of the Fleet’s. We were defeated by one thing only – by the inferior science of our enemies. I repeat – by the inferior science of our enemies…
At the opening of the war our main weapons were the long-range homing torpedo, dirigible ball-lightning and the various modifications of the Klydon beam. Every unit of the Fleet was equipped with these and though the enemy possessed similar weapons their installations were generally of lesser power. Moreover, we had behind us a far greater military Research Organization, and with this initial advantage we could not possibly lose…
Present for the first time at one of our war conferences was Professor-General Norden, the new Chief of the Research Staff, who had just been appointed to fill the gap left by the death of Malvar, our greatest scientist. Malvar’s leadership had been responsible, more than any other single factor, for the efficiency and power of our weapons. His loss was a very serious blow, but no one doubted the brilliance of his successor – though many of us disputed the wisdom of appointing a theoretical scientist to fill a post of such vital importance. But we had been overruled…
Would it be possible to improve our existing weapons, they asked, so that our present advantage could be increased still further?… “Frankly, gentlemen,” said Norden, “I doubt it. Our existing weapons have practically reached finality. I don’t wish to criticize my predecessor, or the excellent work done by the Research Staff in the last few generations, but do you realize that there has been no basic change in armaments for over a century? It is, I am afraid, the result of a tradition that has become conservative. For too long, the Research Staff has devoted itself to perfecting old weapons instead of developing new ones… I believe, in fact, that a revolution in warfare may soon be upon us.”
Norden’s argument, also, was seductively convincing. What did it matter, he said, if the enemy had twice as many ships as we – if the efficiency of ours could be doubled or even trebled?
Read the whole thing. HT: John Kuehn.
The story describes three major leap-frogging technologies. First, the Sphere of Annihilation disintegrates matter, but runs into technical problems. Second, the Battle Analyzer (sort of like AI/ML) uses calculations to control battle, but a lack of training broke morale. Third, the Exponential Field created something like a cloaking device, but each time it was used created cumulative distortions to equipment which resulted in growing chaos. Eventually, the lesser power becomes overwhelming.
Once again, Eric digs up a gem! Let me add a little more context as well. Clarke was offering a critique of the debate he saw unfolding in the late 1940s/early1950s on whether more emphasis should be placed on supporting the current forces or on the military of the future. We hear Professor-General Norden’s words in this Air Force Magazine article from June 1950: “Both Operations and Materiel fell into the trap of concentrating on overhauling and adding a little more horsepower to the force-in-being instead of conducting a vigilant and relentless search for entirely new weapons.” This was viewed by many as a significant problem that was addressed by in 1950 with re-organization moves such as the establishment of the Air Research and Development Command and a new Deputy Chief of Staff for Development.
Thanks Pete, that’s great context. The organizational changes at that time seem important. They reflect the move from evolutionary improvement to the weapon system approach represented by analytical holism — from an informal network of self-determinative technical services to a set of temporary program offices planned by the staff.
Of course, revolutionary changes must be pursued, and that might require setting up units with a mission. But we often underestimate the amount of trial-and-error testing required before new things be integrated into effective operations. Continuous deployment to realistic testing and gradual scaling is perhaps a faster way to get to revolutionary states than compressing everything with a systems approach.
This might be apocryphal, but back in the 70’s and 80’s I heard several times that this story was required reading at West Point. I don’t know whether that’s still true, if it ever was.
The other piece of the story, not generally discussed, is a willingness to commit to a large force. The inferior power wins by a combination of tech that works and overwhelming mass, not just tech that works.