This paper contends that the study of David Packard, the co-founder of electronics firm giant Hewlett-Packard and one of the founding fathers of Silicon Valley, is essential for those who seek to better understand the realm of defense acquisition (the battles before the battle).
However, while Packard opened a window of opportunity that launched a new generation of platforms, very few of his reforms proved durable. The DoD’s approach to procuring weapon systems in recent decades has been characterized by the exact problems that Packard warned against. In the conclusion, the author hypothesizes why Packard’s three problems (concurrency, complexity, and poor management) are systemic, representing the natural state of programs within the defense acquisition system. Overall, this paper will explore how Packard became an agent for positive change and present evidence to make the following claims…
That was Brian Fredrickson, recent graduate from the Air Command and Staff College, over at Over the Horizon, which seems to be a very good resource for information. They also have a podcast, though most topics do not pertain to acquisition.
Here’s some more, which I believe Armen Alchian would have approved of:
Defense acquisition system needs to move slower in the short-run in order to move fast in the long-run. Packard’s sequential, “fly-before-you-buy” approach to acquisition initially appeared to slow efforts to modernize the force; however, by delaying the production decision, increasing the amount of competition in the system, and breaking larger developmental programs into smaller programs (via prototyping competitions), Packard’s approach actually increased options available to senior policy makers in the long run. As this paper will demonstrate, Packard’s approach mattered: the rise of fourth generation airpower was not inevitable, particularly given the austere defense budgets of the 1970s.
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