The Divad gun program was authorized to use for its procurement an accelerated unconventional acquisition strategy which was approved at a 1977 DSARC meeting when initiation of the program was approved. That strategy called for the maximum use of existing proven components, minimum Government intervention, and maximum contractor flexibility in making the engineering judgments to achieve the desired performance and the earliest possible operational capability…
A consequence of this strategy was that it afforded minimal test information to the Government…
We [the Inspector General’s office] have no problem with the [acquisition] process… Our concern is whether the whole process for the DSARC resulted in a good understanding of the demonstrated and reasonably predicted performance of the system in a realistic operational environment.
That was Inspector General Sherick testifying to Congress on September 28, 1984.
The acquisition process as reflected in the 5000 series documents outlines the milestone acquisition process and its approvals through the DSARC (which is now the Defense Acquisition Board). They approve programs into advanced prototyping, full-scale development, and production.
Now, it seems like most of the approach to the Divad air defense system was sound: maximum use of existing components, minimal bureaucracy, maximum flexibility. But Divad was canceled in 1985 after 50 were produced.
The Inspector General, like many others, found the acquisition process sound in concept, but discovered problems of implementation. The IG focused on the problem of reporting information to senior leaders in the DSARC/DAB. Apparently, the program moved along without really reporting what was happening on the system, a consequence of minimal bureaucracy and maximum contractor flexibility.
The incentives from the program office and the contractor were to get the system into production. Back then, there was no Director of Operational Test & Evaluation to provide independent oversight of testing. It would seem then that the testing was cursory or rigged, as was famously depicted in the 1998 comedy film, The Pentagon Wars.
The Inspector General wanted the DSARC/DAB to better understand the predicted performance of systems. Well… isn’t the point of the stage-gate milestone process that you do not need to rely on predictions? They should allow relatively many to enter prototyping because predictions of operational test are still too far off. Then, if a prototype is demonstrated, then it can enter full-scale development. And finally, only after thorough operational testing, should the DSARC/DAB authorize a program into production.
A lack of prediction is not the problem. If anything, prediction is the problem. When we predict the system will work as expected, we lean toward concurrency of R&D and production. When we rely on empirical evidence rather than prediction, then we have a separation of R&D from production, where production only occurs when the system has proven its merit through rigorous testing.
Certainly this was a primary point of David Packard’s 5000 series reforms in the first place, which emphasized a “fly-before-you-buy” mentality. And no, a prototype flyoff is not flying before you buy because the prototype does not integrate the whole suite of sensors, ordnance, and other critical components.
Reference: MANAGEMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. HEARING BEFORE THE COMUTTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS UNITED STATES SENATE NINETY-EIGHTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION PART 9 OVERSIGHT OF THE SGT. YORK (DIVAD) AIR DEFENSE GUN AND THE DSARC DECISIONMAKING PROCESS SEPTEMBER 28, 1984.
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