Can the F-35 take the place of the A-10?

Retaining the A-10 will help the Air Force to preserve to preserve the Warthog community’s hard won close air support skills and expertise. However, the A-10 is only really survivable in a low to medium threat environment, thus it will likely be most valuable in counter-insurgency fights…

 

That being said, the A-10 is not suitable for a high-end fight against a peer level threat such as Russia or China. In a military confrontation against the Kremlin in the European theatre, the A-10 would not be able to get close enough to a Russian Ground Forces’ motor rifle brigade (MRB)—the most common Russian mechanized unit—to engage because of their heavy organic air defenses. Indeed, such Russian MRBs are essentially mobile anti-access/area denial zones.

 

The new Buk M3—which has a range greater than 70 kilometers or about 44 nautical miles—can hit targets flying as low as 50 feet or as high as 115,000ft. Moreover, the Russians claim that the missile system has a probability of kill of better than 0.95. Of course, the Buk-M3 only comes into play if the incoming aircraft survives area air defenses provided by the Russian Ground Forces’ 250 nautical mile range S-300V4 that cover those formations from a distance. Alexey Ramm, editor for military affairs at Russia’s Izvestia newspaper, says that the Buk M3 (and presumably the S-300V4) is able to engage even stealth aircraft such as the F-22 and F-35. However, that claim must be taken with a healthy dose of skepticism.

The article in the National Interest claimed that the A-10 was unsurvivable and the F-35B was not only survivable, but lethal. The article should be taken not with skepticism, but bewilderment. I’m not an aviation expert, but my BS detector went off:

(1) The A-10 is not survivable? The Air Force’s #1 problem with the A-10 is that it is survivable. It keeps getting thrown into real combat (unlike the F-35), it provides valuable ground support, it takes heavy hits as a result, and comes back battle-damaged. That’s what makes it “thin winged,” the fact that it brings airmen home to their families, and eliminates threats to our ground troops.

(2) The F-35 is more survivable? Yeah right. Let’s presume that the F-35 can penetrate various detection systems. If it flies over a battlefield, a couple well-placed shots from an AK-47 could put the F-35 down. It will be moving at high speeds, has no working gun system, and its skin is actually thin. It’s not like the F-35 is invisible to the naked eye. Assuming it will avoid battlefields all-together with beyond-visual range weapons is a perpetual fantasy.

What’s worse, the F-35 doesn’t mask its engine heat like the A-10, making any infrared homing missile far more likely to hit an F-35 if targeted. Moreover, the A-10 has its jet engines mounted externally, and the impact on survivability is hard to overestimate. So the F-35 will avoid high maintenance costs associated with getting shot up, because a single hit means the plane is shot down. (Actually, a pristine F-35 is still orders of magnitude costlier to maintain than an A-10).

The concept of operations for the F-35 will then be — ensure it never gets shot at. That’s ridiculous for the close air support mission.

(3) Here’s another speculative statement:

Based relatively close to the front line in dispersed makeshift bases (similar to the USMC distributed operations), the F-35B could generate rapid sorties carrying eight 250lbs Small Diameter Bomb IIs to strike at each invading Russian mechanized column. A single flight of four F-35Bs each carrying eight SDB IIs—which is a projected capability for the jet for 2022—would be able to destroy 32 enemy armored vehicles in a single sortie. Thus, assuming the F-35B is able to survive against Russian air defenses, four jets flying four sorties per day could potentially devastate a Russian armored brigade. 

So we’re touting 8 SDB IIs for each F-35 that can make 4 sorties per day? None of that is real yet, of course. There’s simply no way you’d throw out an F-35 on 4 sorties per day, even if you did upgrade it to function 8 SDB IIs. The number of sorties is simply a fantasy, and again, presumes there will be no battle-damage coming back.

Even new F-35As off the line and out of harms way had only 51% availability last year. And the F-35B that is being discussed is likely much worse. I’d like to see proof that an F-35B can actually operate from a forward base. And if it did, it would likely need an absurd amount of diagnostic machines and expensive contractor labor.

The cost alone makes high sortie rates prohibited. We see this time and again, that we produce more systems then we can operate, and so many units are grounded to cannibalize them for spare parts and maintenance crew.

The A-10s capabilities are real, however. Unlike the short-legged F-35, the A-10 can loiter over battlefields for hours. It isn’t limited to 8 targets. With its uranium depleted gun, the A-10 can take out far more targets at a much lower cost. 

(4) One comment that made no sense was that the A-10 was only useful in low-intensity conflicts like fighting terrorism. Wait, I thought the A-10 did all the tank busting in the Persian Gulf? But his point was that the A-10 isn’t stealth (low radar cross-section, even if it is vastly more stealthy in terms of heat signature).

That’s really silly. The A-10 is a titanium tub flying around with the world’s most deadly gun. It is a heavy attack aircraft. It was designed based on experiences in WWII and the Korean War. Those were high-end conflicts.

One thing we forget is that a high-end conflict can persist longer than a few days. That means all our stocks of expensive missiles will be depleted. Wars always consume more munitions than expected, and countermeasures are always devised by an innovating enemy. Even the Serbs shot down an F-117. So things get messy; sensors get jammed; clutter is all around. And the A-10 mops it up in a war demanding firepower.

The Light Attack Aircraft will be a downgrade of the A-10. But even that lower-end capability has been delayed, and likely cancelled, by the Air Force. It won’t be buying the Light Attack Aircraft for the foreseeable future, and the Air Force won’t rob a nickle from the F-35.

(5) The military always — always! — overestimates Russian capabilities. The author has no skepticism about Russia’s anti-aircraft missile that can strike planes at 44 nautical miles flying at 50 feet with 95% accuracy. And then the author goes on to say that any ability to track an F-22 or F-35 required a “healthy dose of skepticism.” Selective skepticism, perhaps?

Presuming there is no countermeasure to stealth is dangerous. Presuming that the Russians can hit a low-flying plane, whose heat signature is masked, at a great distance with high accuracy… that requires a equally “healthy dose of skepticism.”

(6) Here’s something on getting the A-10 some new wings to extend its life:

The Air Force intends to order the kit as an indefinite quantity contract—which the service defines as having contract minimum of the first article plus three Low Rate Initial Production articles. The maximum production number would be 112 each of wing sets and 15 kits. The winning bidder would not have to deliver the first low rate production kits until 2029.

So it will take more than a decade to get delivery on the first contract? Ten years!? And notice there’s only 1 development unit, and 3 LRIP units in that contract. I presume there will be a round of test and evaluation after the single development unit, with additional time to make changes before the LRIP option. That might be presumptuous, but even then the A-10 development didn’t take a decade. The RFP went out in 1970, reached first flight in 1972, and even after prolonged testing and difficulties with the gun, it was introduced into operations in 1977. So what’s the excuse?

(7) I highly recommend Pierre Sprey’s two-part account of the A-10 on the POGO podcast.