We conclude with two points. First, regarding accountability: If PMs [program managers] indeed can have little influence over program outcomes, it is unreasonable to hold them fully accountable for those outcomes; however, this opposes NPM’s [new public management’s] approach that has guided defense acquisition for more than two decades. Reformers have treated the PM as an object for improvement, believing that, if the PM’s experience and training could be improved, then program outcomes would improve. This has the effect of deflecting accountability from its proper place—those in the realms of politics and law—and onto an easy target—the PM.
Second, regarding costs and benefits: It seems inherently logical that better trained PMs should have a positive influence in some way on outcomes. However, our analysis did not find much of a relationship. Our results suggest that any improvement based on PM attributes is small at best, but it is also worth noting that our analysis suggests that PM improvements do not worsen outcomes either. Thus, policy makers should perhaps choose to invest scarce reform resources on other factors of acquisition beyond just the PM.
That was from an excellent paper by Adam Eckerd and Keith Snider entitled, Does the Program Manager Matter?
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